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Striking a Balance in the
Cash Balance Plan Debate
REGINA T. JEFFERSONt
INTRODUCTION
Traditional defined benefit plans have undergone
increasing scrutiny by employers. As a result, many
employers have converted their traditional defined benefit
plans to cash balance plans. Several of these conversions
have received widespread attention and have sparked a
contentious debate in the pension community. Some believe
that cash balance plan conversions are unfair to older plan
participants because they reduce their projected retirement
benefits. Others believe that employers should have the
freedom to amend their plans in any manner they choose,
as long as they do not reduce benefits that have already
accrued. This article describes and analyzes the advantages
and disadvantages of using cash balance plans as primary
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retirement savings vehicles, and proposes an approach that
strikes a balance between the concerns of employers and
employees when traditional defined benefit plans are
converted to cash balance plans.
A. Trends in the Private Pension System
The composition of the private pension system has
changed significantly since the passage of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.' When
ERISA was enacted, traditional defined benefit plans were
the most common type of retirement plan, and defined
contribution plans primarily were used as supplemental
savings arrangements.2 Recently, however, employers have
increasingly established defined contribution plans as
primary retirement savings vehicles.3 From the employer's
perspective, this trend can be explained by the fact that
defined contribution plans are less expensive and less
administratively burdensome to maintain than defined
benefit plans. From the employees' perspective, the
popularity of defined contribution plans can be explained by
simpler benefits, and by the ability of workers to change
employment without experiencing significant reductions in
their retirement benefits.4 The latter characteristic is
especially appealing in today's labor market, where the
average employee is expected to hold numerous jobs before
reaching retirement. '
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). ERISA completely revised the
legal framework of the qualified pension plan as it had previously existed. The
most significant innovations of ERISA concerned participation, vesting, and
funding standards. Jurisdiction over employee benefits under ERISA was
divided among the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation.
2. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAw 43 (3d ed. 2000).
3. In 1975, 103,000 defined benefit plans were in existence. The number of
defined benefit plans peaked in 1983 to 175,000 but then decreased to 113,000
in 1990. In contrast, the total number of defined contribution plans increased
from 208,000 to 599,000 between 1975 and 1989 and remained at 599,000 in
1990. See CELIA SILVERMAN ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 139 (1995) [hereinafter EBRI
DATABOOK].
4. This characteristic is referred to as portability. See infra, note 5.
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Day 2000 - 10 Workforce Facts
(Aug. 31, 2000), available at http://dol.gov/ocianews/September-2000/
labor-day2000_fun_facts.htm (last visited May 14, 2001) (stating that the
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The shift from defined benefit plans to defined
contribution plans can be explained by other factors as well.
Since 1974, pension regulation has disproportionately
impacted defined benefit pension plans, making them more
expensive and more difficult to maintain than defined
contribution plans.' Additionally, growth in industries that
have not typically favored defined benefit plans has also
affected the demand for these plans.7  Consequently,
assuming that labor trends remain constant, as baby
boomers approach retirement more employers are likely to
rethink the efficiency of establishing and maintaining
traditional defined benefit plans as the workforce ages.
Aging employees, however, are more likely to place greater
value on traditional defined benefit plans because of the
level of security these plans provide.9
The fastest growing type of defined contribution plan is
the 401(k) plan. 0 The 401(k) plan gets its name from the
section of the Internal Revenue Code that regulates it." The
average American holds 9.2 jobs from the age of eighteen to thirty-four, with
more than half of these jobs being held between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-four).
6. See U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., 401(K) PENSION PLANS: MANY TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE RETIREMENT INcOME 3-4 (1996)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT 1996].
7. See id.
8. Larry Sher, What Are Cash Balance Pension Plans?: Retirement in the
Balance, CONTINGENCIES, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 18. As the traditional defined
benefit plan becomes more expensive and the work force ages, employers will
have to compete for younger employees who will earn more under defined
contribution plan models. Because of the sheer size of the baby boom
generation, it is important to discuss the cohort of the "baby boomer" generation
in determining economic and social policy. Boomers are now in their prime
working years, ranging in age from thirty-six to fifty-four in 2000, but will soon
be entering retirement. See AMi. ASS'N RETIRED PERSONS, AGING BABY BOOMERS:
How SECURE Is THEIR EcONOMfC FUTURE? 4 (1994).
9. Funding: Reich Calls for Pension Reform to Reduce Growing Plan
Underfunding, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 951, 951 (1994) (noting the
Secretary of Labor's concern over the recent trends of increasing sponsorship of
defined contribution plans, and its effect on retirement security for the baby
boomer generation).
10. Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement
Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2000)
(describing the rapid growth of the use of 401(k) plans); see also U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF., PRIVATE PENSION: MOST EIPLOYERS THAT OFFER PRIVATE PENSIONS USE
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 2 (1996) (reporting that, in 1993, 88% of single
employer pension plans sponsored only defined contribution plans, representing
a 20% increase from 1984).
11. See I.R.C. § 401 (1994).
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401(k) plan allows employees to contribute portions of their
salaries to a qualified retirement plan, rather than to
receive them as current compensation in the year in which
they are earned. In most 401(k) plans, contributions are
made on behalf of only those employees who elect to
participate. 2 As a result, low-paid employees who are
covered exclusively by such plans, but who cannot afford to
make contributions, often receive little or no benefits when
they retire."
Although 401(k) plans are appealing to employers and
employees alike, the use of these plans as primary rather
than supplemental retirement savings vehicles, has serious
implications for future retirees and for the private pension
system. The use of 401(k) plans as primary retirement
savings vehicles shifts the risk of benefit shortfall from
employers to employees. This is because, unlike in defined
benefit plans, there is neither a minimum guaranteed
benefit nor Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
protection. 14 Furthermore, some 401(k) plans require that
participants not only decide whether to contribute, and the
level of contribution to make, but also the manner in which
the funds in their accounts are to be invested." These plans,
referred to as participant-directed plans, expose in-
experienced investors to even greater risks than their
employer directed counterparts. Thus, notwithstanding
their popularity, 401(k) plans do not provide the same level
12. See MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS 229-30 (1999)
(providing a definition of cash or deferred arrangement plans).
13. For this reason many employers that maintain 401(k) plans also
maintain defined benefit plans. See GAO REPORT 1996, supra note 6, at 4-6
(finding that 60% of employees with income less than $25,000 per year have no
pension coverage, and subsequently must rely on Social Security as their only
retirement security); Karen Ferguson, 401(k)Plans Benefit the Wealthy, USA
TODAY, Nov. 25, 1997, at 13A; see also Regina T. Jefferson, Comment to
Pensions and Savings-In What Form?, in FRIAING THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DEBATE 107 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998).
14. See Medill, supra note 10, at 11 (noting the risks of investment success
or failure rest with the individual in a participant-directed 401(k) pension plan).
15. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
16. See generally Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined
Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 611-12 (2000) (describing the risk of
benefit shortfalls inherent to 401(k) plans such as a lack of PBGC protection
and fiduciary liability on the part of the employer).
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of retirement income security as traditional defined benefit
plans. 7
B. Types of Plans
The Internal Revenue Code classifies pension plans as
either defined benefit or defined contribution." In a defined
benefit plan, the retirement benefit is expressed as an
annual benefit, payable at the retirement age specified in
the plan. The retirement benefit is determined by a formula
that is usually based upon the employee's service and
compensation.' The employer is responsible for funding the
plan at a level sufficient to pay the promised retirement
benefits to plan participants at their retirements,
regardless of the investment performance of the plan
assets. To fund the plan, the employer makes annual
contributions to an aggregate trust that holds all of the
plan's assets; there are no individual accounts. In order to
protect plan participants in the event of employer
insolvency, most employers who sponsor defined benefit
plans are required to insure the accrued retirement benefits
through the PBGC"
In contrast, in a defined contribution plan each
participant is assigned an individual account. The
17. Approximately twenty-five million employees are covered by a
participant-directed plan. See Marlene Givant Star, Participants in a Quandary
About Plan Options, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 17, 1994, at 19.
Participation in participant-directed plans increased 45% from 1983 to 1993.
See MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PLANS § 16.3, at 787-88 (1996 practitioner ed.).
18. See ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1994) (defining "a defined
contribution plan" as a "pension plan which provides for an individual account
for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed
to the participant's account, and any income... which may be allocated to such
participant's account"); id. § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1994) (defining
"defined benefit plan" as a "pension plan.., which is not an individual account
plan and which provides a benefit derived from employer contributions which is
based partly on the balance of the separate account of a participant"). For a
detailed discussion of the differences between defined contribution and defined
benefit pension plans, see Daniel I. Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax
Equity: An Evaluation of ERISA, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 739, 775-76
(1976).
19. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 42-43 (citing Peter T. Scott, A
National Retirement Income Policy, 44 TAX NOTES 913, 919-20 (1989)).
20. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-71 (1994). Section 1302(a) explains that one of the
reasons for creating the PBGC was "to provide for the timely and uninterrupted
payment of pension benefits." Id. at § 1302(a)(2).
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participant is not guaranteed a specific amount at
retirement; instead, the benefit payable at retirement is
determined by the balance of her individual account.21 The
account balance reflects both employer and employee
contributions and the investment earnings on those
contributions.22 If investments are unfavorable, neither the
employer nor the PBGC is required to make additional
contributions. Therefore, in a defined contribution plan, the
participant alone bears the risk of poor investment
performance. Thus, as a defined benefit plan the cash
balance plan provides significantly more retirement income
security for plan ,articipants than traditional defined
contribution plans. This is especially true relative to self-
directed defined contribution plans in which there are no
guaranteed benefits, and in which there is no input from
the employer regarding the investment decisions that
ultimately determine the adequacy of the retirement
benefits.2
Employers who desire to provide greater retirement
security for their workers, but do not want the
administrative and financial burdens of offering traditional
defined benefit plans, are more likely to establish standard
defined contribution plans, or alternatively, hybrid plans
that combine characteristics of both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans.25 Although hybrid plans have
qualities of both types, they are classified either as defined
benefit or defined contribution plans.26 The cash balance
21. For this reason, defined contribution plans are frequently referred to as
individual account plans.
22. The account balance can also include forfeitures which occur when
employees leave before their accrued benefits become fully vested.
23. See Edward R. Mackiewicz, Pension Plan Terminations: Procedures and
Liabilities, in PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS IN BANKRUPTCY, at 51, 58
(Practising Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. A4-4210, 1988); see also Jefferson, supra note 16, at 644; John R.
Keville, Note, Retire at Your Own Risk: ERISA's Return on Your Investment? 68
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 527, 553-54 (arguing that some form of insurance protection
for members of a defined contribution plan would better protect the individual
members of the pension plan).
24. Keville, supra note 23, at 553-54.
25. See Deana Saxinger, Cash Balance Plans: They Work for Employers but
Do They Work for Employees?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 345, 350 (2000):
Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan
Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 387 (2000).
26. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 395.
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plan is an increasingly popular hybrid plan.27 It has many of
the features of a defined contribution plan, but in reality is
a defined benefit plan."
In a cash balance plan each participant is assigned a
hypothetical account, and the retirement benefit is
expressed in terms of a lump sum. To fund the expected
retirement benefit, the employer makes annual
contributions to the hypothetical accounts. The plan applies
guaranteed annual credits to determine the expected
retirement benefits.29 The annual credit is a proxy for
interest earnings in a defined contribution plan." In order
to ensure that there is a real rate of return over a
participant's working life, the annual credits are often
expressed in terms of either a variable rate, such as the
Treasury rate, or some other amount indexed for inflation.3'
Although participants in cash balance plans appear to have
individual accounts in which their retirement benefit
accrue, in reality, the plan does not maintain individual
accounts. The actual benefit paid at retirement is the
actuarial equivalent of the participants theoretical account
balance. In cash balance plans, the accrued benefits, may or
may not be fully pre-funded." However, as is the case with
all defined benefit plans, the retirement benefits in cash
balance plans are guaranteed by the employer and by the
PBGC.
27. The cash balance plan operates very much like the profit sharing plan in
terms of the contribution formula, but the retirement benefit itself is based on
specific provisions of the plan document rather than the actual experience of
each account. See Plan Administration: IRS Updating COBRA Regulation to
Provide New Guidance, Consultant Says, 19 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 592, 592
(Apr. 6, 1992); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX
REV. 683, 693 (2000).
28. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 392 (explaining that corporations
convert to cash balance plans to avoid backloading).
29. See Vincent Amoroso, Cash Balance Plans, 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 339, 340
(Feb. 22, 1988).
30. See Elizabeth E. Drigotas, Cash Balance Plans: An Overview, TAX MGMT.
FIN. PLAN. J., May 16, 2000, at 3.
31. See Amoroso, supra note 29 (using the Consumer Price Index as an
example interest rate indicator).
32. See U.S. GEN. ACOT. OFF., CASH BALANCE PLANS, IMPLICATIONS FOR
RETIREMENT INCOME 11 (2000) [hereinafter GAO REPORT 2000] (noting that the
trust fund for a cash balance plan is not required to, and often will not have,
assets equal to the sum of all the individual account balances); Jim Davis, The
Individual Advantage Plan: Balancing the Needs of Older and Younger
Employees, BENEFITS PERSP., Fall 2000, at 2.
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There has been some effort to promote cash balance
plans that have the elective contribution characteristic of
401(k) plans." Some of these arrangements even have
employer matching and self-direction features." These
plans, sometimes referred to as "second generation cash
balance plans," present a host of considerations that are
different from those presented by first generation cash
balance plans. Second generation cash balance plans of this
type are uncommon in the United States and therefore are
not considered in this article. 5
It is not the inherent characteristics of cash balance
plans that have attracted the level of attention these plans
have received recently, but rather the particularities of
several highly publicized conversions of traditional defined
benefit plans to cash balance plans. As a result, despite
the volumes that have been written about cash balance
plans, the discussion has been limited. Much has been
written about the effects of certain plan conversions, but
little has been written about the inherent strengths and
weaknesses of cash balance plans themselves.
It is unlikely that the shift toward individual account
plans will change in the near future. 7 Therefore, if defined
benefit plans survive in the current pension climate where
33. Wafaa Babcock & Clare Pitcher, Building the Perfect Plan, BENEFITS
CANADA, May 2000, http://vww.benefitscanada.com/Content/2000/05-00/3.html
(last visited May 15, 2001) (describing a hybrid pension plan that combines a
non-contributory defined benefit plan with an employee-paid defined
contribution component).
34. See id.
35. See id. The lack of literature in the United States about second
generation cash balance plans is noteworthy. Cf id. (describing the popularity
of second generation cash balance plans in Canada).
36. Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 5 (1999) [hereinafter Statement of
Sen. Leahy] (statement of Sen. Leahy) (listing IBM, AT&T, CitiGroup, Bell
Atlantic, SBC Communications, CIGNA Corp., AETNA, Eastman Kodak, and
CBS among the most notable and controversial companies that have converted
to cash balance plans); Ellen E. Shultz, Joy of Overfunding: Companies Reap a
Gain off Fat Pension Plans: Fattened Earnings, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1999, at
Al; see also Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 56 (1999) [hereinafter Statement of
Karen W. Ferguson] (statement of Karen W. Ferguson) (arguing that
conversions to cash balance plans by major U.S. corporations have potentially
devastating adverse effects on retiring Americans).
37. See Alvin D. Lurie, If Fate of Defined Benefit Plans Hangs in the
Balance, Cash Balance Plans Might Be Just the Thing to Save Them, 7 J. TAX'N
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 227, 228 (2000).
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401(k) plans are increasingly popular, it most likely will be
by means of hybrid arrangements, such as cash balance
plans. Thus, it is important to fully explore the role of cash
balance plans as primary retirement savings vehicles.
C. This Article
The first part of this article describes and analyzes the
structure of cash balance plans. The article identifies the
advantages and disadvantages of using cash balance plans
as primary retirement savings vehicles, without addressing
the issues raised by conversions of traditional defined
benefit plans to cash balance plans, which are discussed
later in the article. The article concludes that policies
should be adopted that encourage the establishment of cash
balance plans over defined contribution plans, especially
401(k) plans, in order to provide greater protection to plan
participants.
The second part of the article identifies and explains
the competing interests of employers and employees when
traditional defined benefit plans are converted to cash
balance plans. The article maintains that if cash balance
plans are allowed to develop without undue constraints,
they could be useful in strengthening the private pension
system. However, the article argues that the establishment
of cash balance plans should not be encouraged if
appropriate measures are not taken to adequately protect
affected plan participants at plan conversion.
The third part of the article explores possible solutions
to some of the more pressing problems surrounding cash
balance plan conversions. The article proposes: (1) the
adoption of more stringent notification and disclosure
requirements to ensure that affected plan participants are
fully aware of the significance of changes to their expected
retirement benefits when traditional defined benefit plans
are converted to cash balance plans, and (2) the
establishment of safeguards that prevent plan participants
from experiencing the worst of defined benefit and defined
contribution plan coverage as a result of plan conversion.
Hopefully, the adoption of the proposals presented in this
article will help policymakers come to an equitable and




I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CASH BALANCE PLANS
Although cash balance plans recently have received
widespread attention in connection with several highly
publicized cases, cash balance plans are not a new
development.38  The earliest cash balance plan was
established fifteen years ago by the Bank of America, after
the company determined that a defined contribution plan
would be more effective in retaining its employees than the
traditional defined benefit pension plan it had maintained.:39
Although the bank believed that a defined contribution plan
was preferable to its defined benefit plan, the bank
recognized that switching to a defined contribution plan
would have been an unpopular decision among senior
employees. This was because changing to a defined
contribution plan would have significantly lowered the
expected retirement benefits of older employees." The bank
was also concerned that establishing a defined contribution
plan would shift the investment risk from the employer to
the employees, thereby leaving plan participants
unprotected against adverse market conditions."
Additionally, the bank was aware that changing to a
defined contribution plan would require it to terminate the
existing defined benefit plan and thereby incur substantial
tax liabilities." Consequently, the cash balance plan was
designed as an innovative way for Bank of America to offer
a plan in the style of an individual account plan, without
38. Recent conversions to cash balance plans by major corporations have
included those of IBM, Bell Atlantic, Cigna Corporation, Eastman Kodak, and
SBC Corporation. See Statement of Sen. Leahy, supra note 36, at 5.
39. See Amoroso, supra note 29; see also Jefferson, supra note 16, at 617
n.35 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons Bank of America chose not
to convert to a traditional defined contribution plan). Bank of America is
considered the first recognized cash balance plan conversion, occurring in 1985,
though the General Accounting Office in its 2000 report on cash balance plans
states that the earliest known conversion occurred in 1925; See LANGBEIN &
WOLK, supra note 2, at 61; GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 14.
40. See Ellen E. Schultz, Some Workers Facing Pension Hit Longtime
Employees May Find Themselves on Long 'Plateau' as Companies Make Switch,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1998.
41. Amoroso, supra note 29, at 339.
42. When a plan terminates, the employer is required to pay income and
excise taxes on the surplus assets. Additionally, the accrued benefits of the
affected participants must be immediately 100% vested, and participants must
be provided annuities or lump sum payments. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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having to bear the costs that switching to a defined
contribution plan would have entailed.43
Since the first plan was established, the number of cash
balance plans has risen dramatically." Today, cash balance
plans exist in all sectors of the economy and cover nearly
2.1 million employees." As many as 19% of the Fortune
1000 companies offer these types of plans to their
employees. 6 Cash balance plans are especially popular
among the financial services, health care, and
manufacturing industries.4
The increasing number of cash balance plans reflects
the overall trend toward individual account retirement
plans and away from traditional defined benefit plans.48
From 1980 to 1985, the number of employees covered by
traditional defined benefit plans dropped by 0.8% per year.
In contrast, during the same period of time, defined
contribution plan coverage increased by as much as 5.8%."
From 1990 to 1995, the average number of defined benefit
plans continued to decline by 2.3% per year, while the
number of defined contribution plans rose by 1.9% per
43. See Amoroso, supra note 29, at 339.
44. The number of cash balance plans offered by companies with pension
assets between $1 billion and $5 billion increased from 6% to 17% in 1999. The
number of companies with pension assets of more than $5 billion increased from
6% to 9% in 1999. During that same period of time, the number of cash balance
plans doubled among companies with assets of $100 million to $250 million. See
Ricki Fulman, Greenwich Study: Large Plans See Big Hike in Use of Cash
Balance Plans, 28 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 1, 2000, at 130.
45. See GAO REPORT 1996, supra note 6, at 7.
46. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 13; see also Alex Arcady &
Francine Mellors, Cash Balance Conversions: Assessing the Accounting and
Business Implications, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Feb. 1, 2000, at 22-28 (providing
more information on the rate at which cash balance plans have been
established).
47. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 5.
48. Over the last fifteen years there has been a gradual shift away from
defined benefit plans toward defined contribution plans. See RICHARD IPPOLITO,
PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE ANALYSIS AND POLICY 4-
5 (1997) (noting that the share of workers covered by a defined benefit plan
dropped from 83% to 50% from 1979 to 1996). See supra Part A of Introduction.
49. WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, THE UNFOLDING OF A PREDICTABLE
SURPRISE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL
PENSIONS TO HYBRID PLANS, available at http://vww.watsonwyatt.com/
homepage/us/res/CashBalExS.pdf (last visited May 15, 2001) [hereinafter
WATSON WYATT REPORT].
50. See id. at 2.
2001] 523
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
year.51 As a result of these patterns, defined contribution
plans have now acquired a significant share of the pension
market. They are particularly popular among small to mid-
sized firms, where they are the dominant plan type.
52
No single factor explains the shift from defined benefit
to defined contribution plans; rather, there are numerous
events that have contributed to this development. First,
employment shifts in the economy have impacted the
demand for defined benefit plans. Large unionized firms in
the manufacturing industry have historically selected
traditional defined benefit plans as their primary
retirement savings instruments. 53 However, the number of
unionized firms has declined precipitously in recent years.
54
As a result, the number of defined benefit plans has also
declined. Furthermore, the number of small, non-unionized
companies in the service sectors has been on the rise."
Employers in this sector of the economy typically select
defined contribution plans as their primary retirement
savings vehicle because they are simpler and therefore less
costly to administer. Another reason smaller companies are
more inclined to select defined contribution plans is that
these plans do not expose employers to the risk of poor
investment performance. 5' Accordingly, the expansion of
smaller companies in the service industry has increased the
demand for defined contribution plans.
Second, regulation affecting defined benefit plans has
been more frequent and more burdensome over the last
fifteen years than regulation affecting defined contribution
plans.57 As a result, the cost of maintaining traditional
51. See id.
52. See IPPOLITO, supra note 48, at 5 (stating that defined contribution plans
are particularly popular among firms with less than 1000 employees).
53. See Keville, supra note 23, at 541.
54. See IPPOLITO, supra note 48, at 5.
55. See id.
56. See infra Part H.A.
57. See Defined Benefit Plans: Employers Offer No Replacements in More
Than One-Third of Terminations, BENEFITS TODAY, July 1992, at 223; see also
Vineeta Anand, IRS Cuts Some Slack on Retirement Rules, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Jan. 10, 1994, at 4 (noting the passage of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993); Keville, supra note 23, at 539 n.74 and
accompanying text (noting legislation placed a larger burden on defined benefit
plans than defined contribution plans). The American Academy of Actuaries
conducted a survey of employers that found that termination of defined benefit
524 [Vol. 49
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defined benefit plans has increased disproportionately
relative to that of defined contribution plans. Therefore,
employers concerned about the cost of maintaining
retirement plans for their employees are more inclined to
adopt defined contribution plans than defined benefit plans.
Third, since the legislation establishing 401(k) plans
became effective, there has been a sharp increase in their
number. 9 The 401(k) legislation was adopted in 1978, and
became effective in 1981.60 Although the legislation codified
the position that employers had taken for almost three
decades, 1981 was the first time these arrangements were
sanctioned by the Internal Revenue Service.6' Because
401(k) plans are cheaper, simpler, and more portable than
other retirement savings plans, they have flourished at the
expense of both defined benefit and other defined
contribution plans."
II. THE PROTECTION OF BENEFITS IN CASH BALANCE PLANS
Neither ERISA nor the Internal Revenue Code defines
cash balance plans. However, the Treasury Regulations
describe them as "defined benefit plan[s] that define
benefits for each employee by reference to the amount of the
employee's hypothetical account balance."' As explained
above, in cash balance plans, the hypothetical accounts
plans are occurring in part because of excessive government regulation. See
Jerry Geisel, Weighty Rules Crush Pension Plans, Bus. INs., Mar. 22, 1993, at 3.
58. See Jefferson, supra note 16, at 614-15.
59. GAO REPORT 1996, supra note 6, at 4-6 (finding that approximately one
in four workers that are covered by some form of pension coverage participate
in a 401(k) plan).
60. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). Section 401 (k)
permits profit sharing plans, stock bonus plans, and certain pre-ERISA money
purchase plans to provide cash or deferred arrangements (CODAs). See I.R.C. §
401(k).
61. See Funding: Reich Calls for Pension Reform to Reduce Growing Plan
Underfunding, supra note 9.
62. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-8(c)(3)(i) (as amended in 1993). "Section 414(k)
of the Code addresses the requirements for a combination of defined benefit and
defined contribution arrangements, which some have referred to as a form of
hybrid plan. However, section 414(k) does not address cash balance and similar
hybrid arrangements where one formula has components of both." GAO REPORT
2000, supra note 32, at 10 n.8.
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increase with annual pay credits, which are determined in
the same manner as contributions to defined contribution
plans, such as profit sharing plans.64 The plan guarantees
the payment of annual interest credits, which are
functionally equivalent to investment earnings in
traditional defined contribution plans.65
Although cash balance plans incorporate some of the
features of defined contribution plans, they nevertheless
remain a part of the defined benefit plan system. As a
result, they retain many of the positive characteristics
offered by traditional defined benefit plans, such as
guaranteed benefits, non-elective participation, and
annuitized payments." For this reason, many pension
consultants believe that employees covered by traditional
defined benefit plans do better when their plans are
replaced with cash balance plans than when their Plans are
replaced with standard defined contribution plans.
A. Guarantees
There is greater protection of the expected retirement
benefit in cash balance plans than there is in defined
contribution plans because the employer, rather than the
employee, assumes the primary investment risk.
Additionally, the availability of PBGC insurance provides
significantly greater protection of the expected retirement
benefits in cash balance plans.
64. In a profit sharing plan, there may be an indefinite contribution
formula, but there must be a predetermined and definite formula for
distribution of contributions made to the plan among the participants at some
fixed point in time, such as death or disability. See CANAN, supra note 12, at 93.
65. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25 at 394.
66. Davis, supra note 32, at 2.
67. See Vineeta Anand, Looks Deceiving: It Quacks Like a DC Plan, but It's
Not One, 22 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 31, 1999, at 22 ("[U]nder IRS rules,
workers at a company with a 401(k) plan that converts its defined benefit plan
to cash balance get a bigger benefit than if the employer had terminated the
defined benefit plan and set up a second defined contribution plan.").
68. However, the employer stands to benefit from this arrangement as well
when the plan's actual investment return exceeds the rate stated in the plan,
because the employer will make reduced future contributions. See John L. Utz,
Cash Balance Plans-The Basics, in THE BROUHAHA OVER CASH BALANCE PLANS-
REAL VS. PERCEIVED ISSUES: A NONTECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ISSUES
SURROUNDING CASH BALANCE PLANS 4 (2000); see also Jefferson, supra note 16,
at 644.
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Also, because cash balance plans are defined benefit
plans, the retirement benefits are determined by an accrual
formula, and are definite in amount.69 Thus, the use of
salary scale projections allows participants to determine
their expected retirement benefits. This information gives
participants a better opportunity to prepare for their
retirements, and to increase their personal savings when
necessary. In contrast, in defined contribution plans the
investment experience of the plan can vary drastically from
year to year, causing participants' expected retirement
benefits to differ significantly from the benefits they
actually receive.
Notwithstanding their similarity to defined
contribution plans, however, cash balance plans do not
expose participants to market fluctuations in the same
manner as defined contribution plans. In cash balance
plans, guaranteed annual investment returns effectively
become a minimum retirement benefit.7" If the actual
investment return of the plan assets is less than the
guaranteed rate of return, the employer is liable for the
difference.7' For example, if a cash balance plan guarantees
an annual return of 8% and the actual investment return of
the plan is 6%, the employer would be responsible for the
2% difference.72 Consequently, in cash balance plans
participants are protected against the risk of adverse
market conditions, and against any other factors that could
contribute to shortfalls in their expected retirement
benefits.73
Additionally, because cash balance plans are classified
as defined benefit plans, there is insurance protection
against employer insolvency. When defined benefit plans
terminate with insufficient assets, § 4022 of ERISA
provides that the PBGC shall guarantee the payment of all
69. See Jefferson, supra note 16, at 676.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
71. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 397.
72. But a flat rate of return does not protect participants against inflation. A
variable rate indexed for inflation insures that participants receive a real
return over their working lives. The employer normally will have assumed an
investment return for something higher, such as 10% in the plan, so that there
is some cushion. Thus, if the actual return is 10%, the plan would experience a
gain.




accrued benefits, up to the limit of a single employer plan.74
Thus, in a cash balance plan if an employer were unable to
make the necessary contributions to fund the accrued
benefits of plan participants, and the plan terminated with
insufficient assets, the PBGC would be liable for the
insured portion of the deficiency.75
In contrast, § 4022(b)(1) of ERISA specifically provides
that PBGC protection is not available to individual account
plans. Section 3(34) of ERISA defines individual account
plans as plans in which the level of benefit for each
employee fluctuates depending on the experience of the
account.76 Because the retirement benefit in defined
contribution plans is dependent upon actual contributions
made to the accounts, and upon the investment
performance of each separate account, all defined
contribution plans are excluded from ERISA's insurance
program.77 Therefore, despite the appearance of having
individual accounts, cash balance plan participants are
protected against both market fluctuations and employer
insolvency, whereas defined contribution plan participants
are not.78
B. Participant Choice
In recent years, 401(k) plans have dominated new plan
offerings in the private sector.79 Section 401(k) plans require
74. The maximum insurable benefit is phased in over a period of five years
and equals approximately $35,000 per year. See ERISA, § 4022, 29 U.S.C. §
1322 (1994); § 29 C.F.R. 4022.83 (2000); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at
901-02.
75. In May 1999, the PBGC Corporation had taken over cash balance plans
from the following corporations: American Industries and Resources Corp.,
Sewell Manufacturing Co., Quadrex Corp., Golden Valley Health Center, and
Dill Products Inc. See Anand, supra note 67, at 22. By December 1999, eight
cash balance plans were reported as being taken over by the PBGC, adding to
the list above the Caldor Corporation. See Vineeta Anand, Framing the Issues:
PBGC Puzzles out Benefits for Shuttered Hybrids, 27 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Dec. 13, 1999, at 36.
76. See ERISA, § 4021(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1994); see also id. §
3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (defining a defined contribution plan as a plan
providing an individual account for each participant).
77. See id. § 4021(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (describing the sections of ERISA
that are not covered by the PBGC as an individual account plan).
78. See id. § 4022, 29 U.S.C. § 1322.
79. See Medil, supra note 10, at 7 (noting the dramatic growth of 401(k)
plans in recent years).
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participants to make elections between receiving amounts
in cash, or having the employer contribute portions of their
wages as deferred compensation to a qualified retirement
plan." Under § 402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, all
elective contributions made to a qualified plan are made on
a tax deferred basis.8' To further encourage participation in
401(k) plans, employers often will match the employees'
elected contributions in some form or fashion. 2 For
example, the employer may match the first 1% of pay
contributed by the employee with a 100% match and all
additional contributions with a 50% match.83 Matching
contributions are designed to attract younger and lower
paid employees who might not participate at all in the
absence of such incentives. Even with the prevalence of
such incentives, however, less than one half of all workers
who earn less than $15,000 per year contribute to their
401(k) plans.' Low participation among the non-highly
compensated employees can be a problem for employers
because participation among the rank-and-file employees is
necessary for plans to satisfy the applicable
nondiscrimination rules.85  The failure to meet these
requirements results in a plan losing its preferential tax
status.8 6
The availability of non-elective contributions is another
positive feature of cash balance plans. The annual
contributions made by employers to cash balance plans are
typically made on behalf of all participants. Thus,
employees are guaranteed benefits under cash balance
80. A qualified plan satisfies the rules of § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. A qualified CODA is a plan that meets the requirements of I.R.C. §
401(k)(2), and satisfies the ADP test in I.R.C. § 401(k)(3). See I.R.C. §§ 401(a),
401(k)(3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
81. I.R.C. § 402(a)(8) (1994).
82. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 332-37. The matching
contributions are subject to nondiscrimination rules. See I.R.C. § 401(m) (1994
& Supp. III 1997); Treas. § 1.401(k)-l(b)(3) (as amended in 1995).
83. See id.
84. See EBRI DATABOOK, supra note 3, at 179.
85. A qualified 401(k) must meet minimum coverage requirements, see
I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994), as well as the nondiscrimination requirements for
CODAs. See id. § 401(k)(3)(C).
86. Employer contributions to a qualified retirement plan are not taxed to
the employee until distribution; the investment earnings on the contributions
are not taxed until they are distributed to the employee, and the employer
receives a current income tax deduction for the contributions.
87. See Amoroso, supra note 29.
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plans, whether or not they choose to participate." This
feature eliminates the concern about employees who do not
participate, or who make de minimis contributions to their
401(k) plans. The non-elective quality of cash balance plans
also ensures that the participation rate among non-highly
compensated employees is as high as the participation rate
among highly compensated employees.89 Therefore, unlike
in 401(k) plans, the success of cash balance plans does not
depend on the individual's propensity, or ability to save. "
Furthermore, the absence of the participant-directed
feature that is prevalent among 401(k) plans also increases
the likelihood that cash balance plan participants will
receive the full value of their expected benefits at
retirement.9 Although employers that sponsor 401(k) plans
are not required to allow participants to make investment
decisions, many of them recognize that giving flexibility to
plan participants permits employees to customize their
retirement programs to accommodate their own savings
objectives and risk tolerances." Thus, much of the growth in
the 401(k) area has been driven by plans that give
employees such discretion. These plans, referred to as
participant-directed plans, cover approximately twenty-five
million employees and represent the fastest growing
component of the private pension system.93
In participant-directed 401(k) plans, participants decide
not only whether to participate, and the level of
compensation to contribute, but also the manner in which
their accounts are invested. Because the pension law
imposes no additional education or notification
requirements on employers who sponsor participant-
directed plans, some commentators have questioned the
prudence of allowing inexperienced plan participants to
88. See Medill, supra note 10, at 11-12.
89. See GAO REPORT 1996, supra note 6, at 4-6.
90. See id.
91. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 413.
92. See Medill, supra note 10, at 24-26.
93. See Marlene Givant Star, Participants in a Quandary About Plan
Options, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 17, 1994, at 19. The number of
participant-directed 401(k) plans has grown rapidly. Participation in such plans
increased by approximately 45% from 1983 to 1993, and is attributable in large
part to the creation of new retirement plans by small businesses. See CANAN,
supra note 12, at 788.
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make critical investment decisions regarding their plan
assets.94
The rationale for the employment based characteristic
of the private pension system, as well as for tax advantages
given employers who offer qualified retirement plans, is
that considerable advantages are derived from saving in
employer-sponsored arrangements, when compared to
individual savings arrangements.95 It is believed that one
reason employees fare better in employer-sponsored plans
is that employers are more likely to select long-term
investment strategies that maximize the investment
earnings of plan assets.96 Also, an employer who invests
large sums of money can benefit from economies of scale.97
As a result, the investment returns inside an employer-
sponsored plan should be higher, and administrative costs
should be lower than in outside retirement savings
arrangements. 8
In participant-directed plans, however, it is the
participant, not the employer, who makes the investment
decisions about the plan assets. 9 Because employers are not
required to provide investment education, participants
often make these decisions without the benefit of financial
training. Typically, inexperienced investors disproportion-
ately select low-risk, low-yield instruments, which fail to
maximize their investment returns over the long-run.100
Thus, any advantages derived from economies of scale may
94. See Jefferson, supra note 16, at 629 (arguing that inexperienced
investors should not have sole control of their investment portfolios, but should
be provided with investment guidance from professionals that understand the
use of diversification and proper reading of market indicators).
95. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 29-34 (explaining why pension
plans are employer based).
96. See id. at 32. Another reason for the investment success of employees in
employer-sponsored plans is vider participation.
97. Economies of scale explains why investment fees and other
administrative costs should decrease as the size of the investment increases.
98. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 32.
99. See Medill, supra note 10, at 24-26.
100. See Plan Administration: Diversification is Key to Success of Section




be diminished in participant-directed plans if the
participants make poor investment decisions. 0 '
In contrast, in cash balance plans the employer and the
trustees of the plan, rather than the individual plan
participants, usually have investment control over the plan
assets. 2 These individuals are more likely to make
investment choices that are sufficiently diversified to
maximize returns over the long-run. As a result,
participants in cash balance plans are more likely to benefit
from the intended non-tax advantages of employer directed
retirement savings arrangements. 3
C. Timing and Form of Payment
The form and timing of payments in cash balance plans
also provide additional protection to plan participants. In
traditional defined benefit plans, the normal retirement
benefit is expressed as an amount certain, payable at
retirement in the form of an annuity."4 Annuity contracts
guarantee periodic payments for a specified period of time.
Annuity payments can be made over a fixed number of
years, referred to as an "annuity certain," or made over the
duration of one or more lives, referred to as a "life annuity."
Life annuities provide protection against unexpected
longevity, and are the most effective method by which
individuals can protect themselves against the risk of
outliving their assets. 5
To illustrate the value of a life annuity, consider
individual X, who is age sixty-five, owns a significant
amount of assets, and is preparing for retirement. Further
assume that this individual has no Social Security benefits,
101. See Jefferson, supra note 16, at 629.
102. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RES. INST., CASH BALANCE PENSION PLANS AND
OTHER HYBRID RETIREMiENT PLANS, available at http://www.ebri.orgl
findamentals/chptlO.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
103. See Jefferson, supra note 16, at 638 (noting the shortfalls inherent in
participant-directed plans, such as lack of proper education relating to
investment strategy).
104. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 7.
105. See JEFFREY R. BROWN, How SHOULD WE INSURE LONGEVITY RISK IN
PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY? 5 (Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College, Issue in Brief No. 4, Aug. 2000), available at http://www.bc.edu/
bcorg/avp/csom/executive/crr/issues/ib_4.pdf (describing difficulty of predicting
life span).
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no private pension payments, and no other source of
income. Individual X desires to live in a manner that will
allow her to have sufficient assets to live comfortably for
the duration of her life. Obviously, if X knew her exact date
of death and the rate of return on her investments, it would
be a relatively simple exercise to determine how much she
should spend annually in order not to deplete her assets
before death. However, without this information it is
difficult, if not impossible, to allocate her wealth so as to
achieve this goal.'
Although life expectancy tables are useful for this
purpose, they are inexact.0 7 There is substantial variation
in the life expectancies of individuals within groups and
thus much uncertainty about the predictions for their
remaining lives. For example, an average sixty-five year old
man in the year 2000 can expect to live an additional 16.4
years, but an average sixty-five year old woman can expect
to live an additional 19.6 years.'0 However, 12% of men and
7.7% of women die prior to reaching age seventy, and as
many as 18% of men and 31% of women live to age ninety
or beyond."9 Therefore, despite the use of predictors, such
as life expectancy tables, interest rate assumptions, and
family histories, life annuities are one of the most practical
ways of solving the wealth allocation problem for retirees.
In addition to solving the allocation problem, another
benefit that life annuities provide is the assurance that the
money will not be withdrawn prior to retirement and used
for current consumption. Plans that provide payment in the
form of lump sum distributions when employees leave the
company prior to retirement allow individuals to spend
their retirement savings long before retirement."' Although
the law permits participants who receive pre-retirement
lump sum distributions to roll them over tax-free into other
qualified retirement plans, or to individual retirement
arrangement (IRAs), most individuals who receive lump
sum distributions from their retirement plans do not
106. See id.
107. It is also helpful to know an individual's family history and current
medical condition.
108. See BROWN, supra note 105.
109. See id.
110. A lump sum payment made prior to retirement would be the actuarial
equivalent of the life annuity paid at the normal retirement age.
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reinvest them in this manner."' Obviously, when lump sum
distributions are not reinvested in other retirement savings
instruments, it is far more likely that the funds will be used
for non-retirement purposes. As a result, there will be fewer
remaining assets to grow tax-free as retirement savings."2
The Congressional Research Service recently reported
that only 33% of recipients who received lump sum
distributions reinvested them in other retirement savings
vehicles."3 Not surprisingly, younger workers are far less
likely than older workers to reinvest lump sum payments in
other retirement savings arrangements when they receive
them prior to retirement. As few as 27% of workers between
the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four reinvest their
retirement funds in other qualified retirement savings
vehicles, as compared to 42% of those between the ages of
forty-five and fifty-four." 4 Data also shows that the
propensity to roll-over varies with the size of the
distribution."5 Distributions of larger amounts are more
frequently rolled over than distributions of smaller
amounts.116
Regardless of age, almost all employees choose lump
sum payments whenever they are available."7  One
employer reported that participants leaving the company
prior to retirement took lump sum payments even when the
value of the annuity payments was significantly higher
than the lump sum payments."8 Other employers reported
that terminating employees asked them to distribute their
lump sum payments directly to businesses, such as auto
repair shops."' These reports are troubling, but
nevertheless consistent with studies on participant
behavior. These studies reveal that in spite of substantial
tax penalties, workers who receive lump sum distributions
111. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RES. INST., FACTS FROM EBRI: ROLLOVER RATES
(2000), available at http://www.ebri.org/facts/0300factl.htm (last visited May
15, 2001) [hereinafter EBRI FACTS].
112. See I.R.C. §§ 72(t), 401(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
113. GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 31.
114. Id.
115. See EBRI FACTS, supra note 111.
116. See id.
117. See Elizabeth A. White, PBGC: Official Predicts PBGC Surplus Will
Grow Again for 1999 Fiscal Year, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA), Oct. 18. 1999, at
2439.
118. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 31.
119. See id.
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are more likely to cash out the funds for current
consumption.'20 This is a serious social problem. As life
expectancies increase, it is more important than ever for
individuals to protect themselves against the risk of
outliving their assets. 1 For this reason, economists
maintain that life annuities are an essential component of
any retirement portfolio.
With respect to both timing and form of distribution the
pension law is inconsistent regarding its treatment of pre-
retirement distributions from tax-favored retirement
plans.1 2  In some instances early distributions are
discouraged with penalties, and in other pre-retirement
situations they are not.'23 Additionally, in some plans,
annuity options are required, but in others they are not.'24
Generally, tax qualified defined benefit plans are not
permitted to make distributions to employees while
employment continues.'25  Either at retirement, or at
termination of employment, defined benefit plans are
permitted to make payments in the form of lump sum
distributions, or in a series of payments over a number of
years.'26 In contrast, 401(k) plans are permitted to make
distributions of any amount, at anytime during
employment, provided the participant has attained the age
120. See LEONARD BURMAN ET AL., WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU SHOW THEM
THE MONEY?: LuMP-SuM DISTRIBUTIONS, RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1999).
121. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 4-5.
122. Daniel I. Halperin, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: A Rational
Model for the 21st Century, in SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME
POLICY 159, 178 (Jack L. Vanderhei ed., 1987) (noting that in regard to pre-
retirement distributions, inconsistencies exist because distributions are
prohibited, or discouraged by excise taxes in some instances but are freely
allowed in others).
123. I.R.C. § 72(t) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Halperin, supra note 122, at 178.
124. I.R.C. § 72(t).
125. There are exceptions for payments on account of disability. See id. § 72.
126. Halperin, supra note 122, at 178. When accrued benefit exceeds $5,000,
however, the code requires qualified defined benefit plans to provide
participants an option of receiving their benefits in the form of an annuity or as
a series of payments for life, beginning at the plan's normal retirement age. See
GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 31 n.24; Jonathan Barry Forman, How




of fifty-nine and a half, or in the event the participant
experiences financial hardship.
The normal form of payment in a defined benefit plan is
a qualified joint and survivor annuity (QJSA) for married
participants.'28 A QJSA is an annuity payable for the life of
the participant, with at least a 50% survivor benefit for the
surviving spouse. 29 The equivalent benefit for an unmarried
participant is a life annuity. In addition to the normal form
of benefit, defined benefit plans may, and often do, offer
other forms of distribution, such as annuity options with
greater survivor benefits, or payments over a certain
number of years. Lump sum payment options are less
common among traditional defined benefit plans, but
presumably they will increase since the aggregate demand
for this form of payment is on the rise in all plans.130
Because they are considered defined benefit plans, cash
balance plans are also required to offer benefits in the form
of QJSAs for married participants and single life annuities
for unmarried participants.' However, practically all cash
balance plans offer both a lump sum form of payment at
retirement or termination of employment, as well as an
annuity payable at retirement, since portability is one of
the touted advantages of cash balance plans.' Not
127. If the plan provides for hardship distributions, the regulations
establish a two part test for hardship. First, the employee must have an
"immediate and financial need"; second, the distribution must be necessary to
satisfy the financial need. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2) (as amended in
1995). A significant exception to this rule is that profit sharing plans other than
401(k) plans can make distributions while service continues, subject to certain
limitations. Gayle Stutzman Evans, Estate Planning with Qualified Plans and
IRAs, in BASIc ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION AND PLANNING (ALI-ABA Course of
Study 2001).
128. See I.R.C. § 401.11(A) (1994).
129. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 580, 586.
130. See id. at 170.
131. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (1994) (recognizing that payments can also be
made in a series of payments). Under federal pension law, a defined benefit
plan is any plan that does not provide actual individual accounts. See id. §
414(j) (1994). However, because the retirement benefits in a cash balance plan
are defined in terms of a hypothetical account balance, it is necessary for the
plan to specify an annuity conversion rate or method for determining the
actuarial equivalent annuitized payment of the "account balance." See Drigotas,
supra note 30.
132. Only 15% of the firms in a survey conducted by the GAO had lump sum
payment options in their traditional defined benefit plan before conversion;
however, after conversion, "95 percent of the firms allowed a lump sum
distribution although 13 percent limited the option by offering it only at normal
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surprisingly, cash balance plan participants over-
whelmingly select lump sum payments. Nevertheless, in
cash balance plans, a participant who desires annuitized
payments has the opportunity to receive the additional
protection that this form of payment provides. Annuity
options may not be especially beneficial to individuals who
terminate employment prior to retirement because they are
better off leaving their funds in the plan. However, this
form of payment is important to individuals who terminate
employment at retirement and wish to protect themselves
against the risk of outliving their assets.
Section 401(k) plans are not required to offer annuitized
retirement payments. Lump sum distribution is the most
common form of distribution in 401(k) plans. Only 27% of
the 401(k) plans in existence in 1997 offered plan
participants the option of choosing a life annuity at
retirement.134 The figures for other types of defined
contribution plans are similarly low. Consequently, over
70% of nearly fifty million defined contribution plan
participants in the United States are unable to receive their
retirement benefits in a manner that directly protects them
against longevity.1
5
Historically, traditional defined benefit plans have
provided the second largest source of annuity income to
retirees in this country. Social Security has provided the
largest. Approximately 7.2 million of the 17.4 million
individuals over the age of fifty-five who retired from
private sector jobs receive annuity income from a private
pension plan.' The average annual annuity income for
those receiving annuity income from a private pension was
$9714; the aggregate income for the group was $70 billion
in 1994."' Therefore, one implication of the trend away from
using defined benefit plans to 401(k) plans for primary
retirement savings vehicles is a decline in the availability of
annuitized benefit payments. Furthermore, the prevalence
of 401(k) plans means that there is a greater opportunity
retirement age or on only a portion of pension benefits." GAO REPORT 2000,
supra note 32, at 31.
133. See EBRI FACTS, supra note 111.
134. See BROWN, supra note 105, at 16.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 6 (reporting the findings of the September 1994 Health and




for pre-retirement distributions on account of financial
hardship. Taken together, these characteristics make it
more likely that participants in cash balance plans will
have greater retirement income security than participants
in 401(k) plans. 38
D. Disadvantages for Some Plan Participants
Notwithstanding the distinct advantages in cash
balance plans relative to defined contribution plans, cash
balance plans are less advantageous for some employees
than for others because of the manner in which the cash
balance plan benefits accrue.139 In general, cash balance
plans provide better benefit value to younger participants
than do traditional defined benefit plans. Conversely, older
participants may be disadvantaged under the cash balance
plan design. This is true for both converted and
unconverted cash balance plans. 4°
The relative advantage for older employees in
traditional defined benefit plans occurs because there is a
determinable projected retirement benefit. In such plans,
the rate of benefit accrual directly correlates to the interval
between the time at which the benefit accrues and the
participant's actual retirement date.14 ' The shorter the
discount period, the more valuable the retirement benefit.'
Consequently, the value of the accrued benefits can vary
significantly relative to the age and service of individual
participants. 43 This relationship causes older participants
to fare better under traditional defined benefit plans than
younger participants.
138. See supra Part II.B.
139. See Norman Stein, Some Serious Questions About Cash Balance Plans,
CONTINGENCIES, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 29-30.
140. Davis, supra note 32, at 1 (noting that the cash balance plan's
individual account format is easier for both younger and older employees to
understand).
141. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the Time Value of
Money, 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1980); see also ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL WORKGROUP,
STATEMENT OF NORMAN P. STEIN ON CASH BALANCE PLANS (1999), available at
http://www.benefitslink.com/articles/normanstein.shtml (last visited May 15,
2001).
142. Stein, supra note 139, at 29.
143. See id.
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Furthermore, in traditional defined benefit plans older
employees are advantaged because the retirement benefit
generally is based on a final pay formula in which
compensation and service are taken into account."' The
final compensation used in the accrual formula typically is
determined by using average income; thus, an increase in
compensation in any one year will increase the value of the
benefit accruals for all prior years.'45 As a result, in
traditional defined benefit plans a substantial portion of an
employee's retirement benefits can accrue in the final years
of employment. It is not unusual for employees who spend
their entire working lives with a single employer to accrue
more than one half of their retirement benefits during their
last years of employment, when their wages typically are
highest.146 For this reason, the termination or conversion of
traditional defined benefit plans can reduce disproportion-
ately the expected retirement benefits of participants with
greater service unless affirmative measures are taken to
prevent this outcome.' 47
To illustrate the effects of increased wages in later
years, consider a plan with an accrual formula of 2% of final
pay times years of service, where final pay is the average of
the highest five consecutive years of compensation. Assume
a participant with ten years of service had compensation of
$50,000 per year for the final five years of her employment.
Prior to that time, assume that her annual compensation
was less than $50,000. Under this plan's accrual formula,
her accrued benefit would equal 2% times ten years of
service times $50,000, or $5000 per year. If in her last year
of employment her compensation had risen from $50,000 to
$75,000, her accrued benefit would equal 2% times ten
times $55,000, or $5500 per year. Therefore, the pay
increase in her tenth year of employment increased the
value of the accruals for the nine prior years of service,
significantly.
In contrast, younger employees benefit more under
individual account plan models, including cash balance
144. See id. at 29-30.
145. For example, a plan may use the highest three consecutive years to
determine final compensation.
146. See Stein, supra note 139, at 29. For this reason some have argued that
there is breach of contract when an employer terminates or converts a
traditional defined benefit plan and fails to reward long-term service. See id.
147. See id.; infra Part V.
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plans, than traditional defined benefit plans. This is
because the retirement benefits accrue more rapidly in
individual account plans." To illustrate, consider an
employee who terminates at age forty-five with twenty
years of service under a traditional defined benefit plan.
Assume the plan has an accrual formula of 1% per year of
service times compensation. Thus, the participant would
have earned a 20% benefit based on compensation when she
terminates employment. This benefit does not reflect
projected salary increases. By comparison, if the
contribution level of a defined contribution plan is
calculated with reference to an expected retirement benefit,
based upon projected salary increases, the percentage of
contributions and the investment build-up on the
contributions will be greater than if the plan had
anticipated no salary increases. The increase will be
reflected in the accrued benefit.' Thus, the measurement
of accrued benefits before retirement in individual account
plans is more favorable to younger more mobile
employees. 5 ' However, older employees who continue to
work after normal retirement age also stand to benefit more
in cash balance plans because the actuarial value of the
benefit does not decrease in later years.
15
Interestingly, employees who make mid-career changes
may not be able to accrue sufficient years of service under a
traditional defined benefit plan to take advantage of the full
effect of the application of higher earnings. They also may
not have sufficient time before retirement to accrue
adequate benefits under a defined contribution plan, or
cash balance plan, to fully benefit from the more rapid
accruals in these plans. Therefore, an individual whose
coverage changes mid-career from traditional defined
benefit plans to cash balance plans may experience the
worst of both worlds. This result, however, is not inevitable.
Employers can avoid this effect when they convert
traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans by
using age weighted contribution formulas, or by introducing
148. See Halperin, supra note 122, at 185-86.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See Drigotas, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that the rate of accrual
past normal retirement age ordinarily is higher in cash balance plans than in
traditional defined benefit plans).
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other measures designed to enable plan participants to
accrue their full projected benefits.
III. THE CASH BALANCE PLAN CONTROVERSY
A. Plan Conversions
When employers amend their retirement plans there
are specific requirements regarding benefit accruals that
must be satisfied in order for the plan to continue receiving
the tax benefits accorded to qualified retirement plans.'
One of these requirements prohibits employers from
reducing retirement benefits that have already accrued.5 '
However, this rule does not prohibit employers from
amending their plans to reduce future accruals. Therefore,
plans may be amended prospectively to limit, for example,
the number of years over which retirement benefits accrue,
or to modify the structure of their accrual formulas.'54
Most of the cash balance plans in existence today
resulted from such amendments. Cash balance plans
generally have not been established by employers as their
first retirement savings programs, or even as supplemental
ones. Instead, cash balance plans have been used almost
exclusively in connection with conversions from traditional
defined benefit plans.'55 Most of these plans were converted
by either freezing the accrued benefits of the existing
traditional defined benefit plan, or by amending their
accrual formulas to cash balance plan accrual formulas.'56
Employers give numerous reasons for converting their
traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans.
Some employers report that their companies have converted
to cash balance plans in order to harmonize their benefits
152. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623); see
also GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 12 (noting that the ADEA, Internal
Revenue Code, and ERISA govern the requirements for pension plans
established by employers).
153. ERISA § 204(a), 29 U.S.C. 1054(a) (1994); I.R.C. § 411(d)(6) (1994).
154. See id.
155. Less than 10% of cash balance plans were established by companies as
their first pension plan, a supplement to an existing defined contribution, or as
an addition to an existing defined benefit plan. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra
note 32, at 15.
156. See Arcady & Mellors, supra note 46, at 24.
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after mergers or acquisitions.'57 Others have said that they
converted their plans to be more competitive within a
particular industry.' Some employers have even suggested
that they converted their plans because many of their
employees have had 401(k) plans at other points in their
careers and are thus more familiar with cash balance plan
benefits than the benefits of traditional defined benefit
plans.'59 By far, however, the reason given most frequently
by employers for their conversions is that the benefits in
cash balance plans are easier to understand than those in
traditional defined benefit plans.16 Employers explain that
because benefits under cash balance plans are expressed in
lump sum values rather than annuities, their employees
better understand and appreciate the value of their
retirement benefits. 6'
However, because the conversion of traditional defined
benefit plans to cash balance plans can significantly reduce
future plan costs, as well as avoid the imposition of
substantial income and excise taxes, it is difficult to believe
that financial considerations are not among the primary
reasons for many cash balance plan conversions. 16 Thus, it
would seem that employers and consultants who suggest
that plan cost was not considered in their decisions to
convert their traditional defined benefit plans to cash
balance plans are either uninformed or insincere.'63 The fact
157. That is to provide the same pension plan for employees that had been
covered by different plans. See Vineeta Anand, Conversion Question: After
Buying CBS, Viacom May Take Its Lead, 28 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June 26,
2000, at 22.
158. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 17.
159. See Jerry Geisel, Survey Aims to Find Facts About Cash Balance Plans,
BUS. INS., May 22, 2000, at 10.
160. See id. (citing a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey based on ninety-five
responses from companies that have converted traditional plans to cash balance
plans, in which most of the reporting companies cited this as a reason for
converting).
161. See supra Part H.C. This belief is confirmed by pension consultants
who report that benefits accrued under traditional defined benefit plans are the
most misunderstood and unappreciated benefits in a worker's compensation
package. Davis, supra note 32, at 2.
162. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
163. See Vineeta Anand, Winners and Losers: Opinions Split on How
Workers Fare, 20 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 31, 1999, at 20 [hereinafter
Anand, Winners and Losers] (noting global competition forces companies to cut
costs wherever possible).
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that most cash balance plans are established as converted
traditional defined benefit plans rather than as newly
established plans supports this assertion.'"
Although reducing operating cost is a reasonable
consideration for employers and company executives, the
use of plan assets to improve the financial position of a
company is extremely controversial. Since there is a
prohibition against reducing past accrued benefits, future
plan costs must be reduced in order to increase plan savings
or create plan surpluses. However, reducing future accruals
to save future plan costs at the expense of certain plan
participants has raised many serious legal, policy, and
equity concerns in connection with cash balance plan
conversions.
B. The Controversy
Proponents of cash balance plan conversions argue that
cash balance plans are responsive to the needs of younger,
more mobile workers who are disadvantaged under the
traditional defined benefit plan model.'65 They espouse the
employers' position that cash balance plans provide simpler
and relatively more valuable retirement benefits for many
workers.'66 Proponents further maintain that the fact that
employers bear the risk of shortfall in cash balance plans
justifies any gain that they may realize on plan
conversion.'
164. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 407 (describing the cost savings
available in converting defined benefit plans to cash balance plans). But see
WATSON WYATT REPORT, supra note 49, at ii (finding the average employer
saved only 1.4% in costs in converting a defined benefit plan to cash balance
plan).
165. See Richard C. Shea et al., Age Discrimination in Cash Balance Plans:
Another View, 19 VA. TAX REv. 763, 764 (2000) (arguing that traditional defined
benefit plans disproportionately disadvantage younger employees by
constraining worker mobility and forcing employees to stay with one employer
because of the "backloading" inherent in defined benefit plans); cf Zelinsky,
supra note 27 (arguing that cash balance plan conversions are disadvantageous
to older employees).
166. See supra Part I.
167. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 952 (citing Daniel Fischel & John
H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule,
55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1105, 1149-52 (1988)).
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Critics of cash balance plan conversions argue that
when plan savings occur on plan conversion, they are
unjustly generated at the expense of certain workers.16
They explain that replacing traditional defined benefit
plans with cash balance plans significantly reduces the
expected retirement benefits of older employees.'69 These
reductions can cause employees with greater service to
experience the worst of both the traditional defined benefit
plan and the cash balance plan. ° Some critics maintain
that this result is particularly egregious since plan
participants may have accepted lower wages in reliance on
the receipt of their projected retirement benefits."' Thus,
opponents believe many conversions are merely an
unobtrusive way for companies to reduce the retirement
benefits of older workers while appearing to improve the
plans they sponsor."'2 Additionally, some opponents argue
that the conversions of traditional defined benefit plans to
cash balance plans are effectively plan terminations, and as
such should be subject to similar constraints and tax
treatment as those imposed when traditional defined
benefit plans terminate."'
168. See Statement of Karen W. Ferguson, supra note 36 (arguing that
conversions to cash balance plans by corporations have adverse effects on older
employees); Zelinsky, supra note 27 (arguing that cash balance plans are
disadvantageous to older employees); Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 146-48 (1999),
available at http://vww.aarp.org/wwstand/testimony/1999/092199.html (last
visited Aug. 17, 2001) (statement of American Association of Retired Persons)
(arguing that older workers will inevitably face reductions in plan benefits due
to conversion to cash balance plans).
169. But see Vineeta Anand, Potential Reductions Weren't Disclosed, 20
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June 26, 2000, at 13 (stating that "the majority of
companies did not save pension costs by switching to cash balance plans in the
short term").
170. Jonathan Barry Forman, Senate Finance Committee Gives Green Light
to Cash Balance Conversion, 89 TAx NOTES 141, 142 (2000) (noting that "for
many years after the conversion, [employees] will not see any increase in the
present value of their retirement benefit"); see supra Part II.D.
171. See infra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
172. See Anand, Winners and Losers, supra note 163, at 20 (comparing and
contrasting the differing viewpoints regarding cash balance plan conversion).
Proponents of cash balance plans argue conversion to a cash balance scheme
benefits all employees more than conversion to a defined contribution plan. See
id.
173. See generally sources cited supra note 164. Currently, upon plan
conversion, employers benefit from plan surpluses without the imposition of the
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IV. THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
A. The Impact of Plan Conversion on Older Workers
Because of their disparate impact on older workers,
there is concern that cash balance plan conversions are
particularly unfair to these employees." 4 This concern has
led to some of the most contentious debates regarding cash
balance plan conversions.' There are three different
reasons older participants are more severely affected by
cash balance plan conversions than younger participants.
The first relates to the fundamental design of the cash
balance plan.' 6 As described above, in cash balance plans
annual interest credits accrue with the annual benefit
credits.' Accordingly, the more years remaining before
retirement the greater the value of the interest accrual will
be. Therefore, when annual contributions and the annual
interest credits associated with them are converted into an
accrued benefit payable at normal retirement age, the
accrual rates of younger participants will be higher and
those of older participants will be lower.' 8
The effect of "wear-away" periods is the second age
related issue raised by cash balance plan conversions.
However, unlike the issue regarding the discount period,
tax liabilities that ordinarily are imposed when excess assets revert to plan
sponsors.
174. See Davis, supra note 32, at 1 (arguing for the implementation of an
"individual advantage" design in order to correct the discrepancies in cash
balance plans between older and younger employees).
175. Age discrimination in pension plans is prohibited by the Internal
Revenue Code, the ADEA, and ERISA, which specifically provide that "a
defined benefit plan shall be treated as not satisfring the requirements ... if
under the plan, an employee's benefit accrual is decreased, or the rate of an
employee's benefit accrual is reduced, because of... age." I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H)
(1994); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994); ERISA § 204 (B)(1)(H), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(h)
(1994).
176. As is the case with all defined benefit plans, the accrued benefit under
the plan is calculated as an annual benefit payable at normal retirement age.
See I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
177. This relationship prevents "backloading," which is the practice of
designing a plan to accrue benefits disproportionately toward the end of an
employee's working career. Backloading is viewed suspiciously because it has
the potential to circumvent the vesting rules. See Forman, supra note 132, at
388-93 (discussing the implications of backloading in traditional defined benefit
plans).
178. See Drigotas, supra note 30, at 115.
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the wear-away problem relates specifically to plan
conversion rather than plan design.'79 A wear-away period
prevents employees from accruing new benefits under a
converted cash balance plan until the accruals in the cash
balance accounts exceed the value of the benefits already
accrued under the prior accrual formula.8 ' Participants who
terminate employment during the wear-away period are
entitled to receive the larger of the two benefits.18'
Consequently, some participants may have to work several
years before earning pension benefits beyond those already
accrued at the time of conversion, while other participants
working during the same period may immediately accrue
benefits under the new accrual formula.'82 Since older
workers generally have accrued larger benefits before
conversion, their wear-away periods tend to be longer than
those of their younger counterparts.'83 Wear-away periods
created at plan conversion are also more burdensome for
older workers because they coincide with their later years of
employment. As a result, they are more likely to interrupt
the compounding effect of higher pay and greater service on
the benefit accruals of older workers."M
Related to the wear-away issue are concerns about the
manner in which the opening balances of the cash balance
plans are calculated on plan conversion. When traditional
defined benefit plans are converted to cash balance plans,
an opening account balance is established for each
participant. 85 The balance is determined by calculating the
lump sum present value of each participant's accrued
benefit under the existing defined benefit plan as of the
date of conversion. To calculate the present value of the
accrued benefit, an interest rate assumption is used.'86
179. See Arcady & Mellors, supra note 46, at 25.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 24; see also Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 403 n.106
(providing a detailed example of the effects of a wear-away period) (citing I.R.S.
Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359).
182. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 28.
183. Arcady & Mellors, supra note 46, at 24.
184. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 28.
185. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 61-62; see also Arcady & Mellors,
supra note 46, at 24.
186. The interest rate can differ from the interest rate assumed for funding
purposes. However, the interest rate must be reasonable.
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Employers have discretion in the selection of the interest
rate assumption, and their selection can significantly affect
the lump sum present value of the accrued benefits."' The
higher the investment rate assumption, the smaller the
initial lump sum present value.8 ' If the interest assumption
used to calculate the opening account balances is less
conservative than the one used in connection with the
funding of the existing defined benefit plan, there can be
substantial savings for the employer. 9 For instance, the
lump sum present value of an accrued benefit payable in
ten years calculated using a 20% rate of return equals
roughly one-half of the value determined using an interest
rate of 12%."90 Therefore, the selection of the assumptions
used in calculating the opening account balances can
exacerbate the disparate impact of the wear-away period on
older workers.
Finally, a third issue raised by cash balance plan
conversions that disproportionately affects older workers is
the elimination, or reduction, of subsidized early retirement
benefits. 9' Early retirement incentive programs are
structured in a variety of ways. Some plans offer early
retirement programs based on years of service alone. For
example, a "thirty and out" program would allow a worker
with thirty years of service to retire with full benefits,
regardless of age. Other plans combine age and service
requirements. For example, under an age fifty-five and
twenty year program, a forty-five year old employee with
twenty years of service would be ineligible to receive early
retirement benefits.
An early retirement benefit is calculated by computing
a participant's accrued benefit payable at normal
retirement, based upon her service and compensation as of
the early retirement date. Then, using actuarial
assumptions for interest and mortality, the normal
retirement benefit is reduced to reflect the fact that
187. The rule of thumb that actuaries use is that a 25% change in the
interest rate assumption is a change in liabilities of approximately 6% in a
valuation period. STUART G. SCHOENLY, PENSION TOPICS 18 (1991) (Society of
Actuaries No. 460-24-91).
188. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 403-04.
189. See id.
190. For detailed discussion of present value see STEPHEN B. COHEN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 200 (1989).
191. See Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 699.
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payment will begin sooner, and will be made over a longer
period of time. The normal retirement benefit will also be
reduced because the assets supporting the payments will
earn less investment income prior to distribution.'92 The
amount of the reduction depends on the interest rate
assumption and the age of the participant. For example,
when a 6% interest rate assumption is used, the percentage
reduction of the early retirement benefit is approximately
10% per year."' Therefore, an early retirement benefit
payable at age sixty is reduced to 50% of the normal
retirement benefit payable at age sixty-five.'
It is customary for traditional defined benefit plans to
offer early retirement programs.' Moreover, employers
who sponsor traditional defined benefit plans often
subsidize the cost of their early retirement benefits, making
these benefits more valuable than their actuarially
equivalent normal retirement benefits. An estimated 80% of
Fortune 500 companies offering traditional defined benefit
plans subsidize their early retirement benefits in some
manner.'96 The subsidy for these buyouts can account for as
much as 50% of the plan's current funding cost.'97
Most cash balance plans do not provide subsidized early
retirement benefits. In fact, when conversions of traditional
defined benefit plans occur, employers typically eliminate
or cut back their subsidized early retirement benefits.9 '
This decision can significantly reduce plan liabilities and
result in the creation of even larger plan surpluses for the
employer.'99 Although the anti-cutback rule that applies to
past accruals also applies to plan enhancements, such as
subsidized early retirement benefits, the rule does not
require that plans continue to allow participants to accrue
192. See DAN M. MCGILL & DONALD S. GRUBBS, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 131-35 (6th ed. 1989).
193. See id. at 448.
194. See id.
195. Early Retirement: Legislative Attempts to Reverse Trend Conflict with




198. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 18.
199. Arcady & Mellors, supra note 46, at 28.
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early retirement benefits after the date of conversion. 2"0 The
anti-cutback rule only requires that participants who
satisfy the conditions for the benefit before or after the
amendment receive the value of the benefit accrued as of
the date of the conversion."1 Thus, after conversion, plans
must continue to provide early retirement benefits with
respect to benefits accrued before plan conversion, but they
are not required to count service after the conversion date
toward early retirement benefit accruals. Participants with
greater service and closer to early retirement eligibility are
impacted more severely when employers eliminate or
reduce subsidized early retirement benefits because they
have less time to make up the difference with personal
savings. Obviously, individuals in this situation are more
likely to be older employees.
B. The Recapture of Excess Plan Assets
1. The Fiduciary Rules. The recapture and use of
surplus pension assets is another issue at the core of the
cash balance plan controversy. One of the primary goals of
ERISA is to establish higher fiduciary standards in order to
provide greater protection for retirement benefits.0 2 Thus,
the essence of ERISA's fiduciary law stems from a duty of
loyalty, designed to protect pension funds against internal
defalcation.! However, some have argued that cash
balance plan conversions give plan sponsors inappropriate
access to pension assets, thereby circumventing ERISA's
fiduciary laws. 4
Section 401(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities of the plan, it
200. A plan may not be amended to eliminate or reduce early retirement
benefits "attributable to service before the amendment." See I.R.C. §
411(d)(6)(B)(i) (1994); ERISA § 204(g)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1054(g)(2)(A) (1994).
201. See I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)(B)(i); ERISA § 204(g)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.
1054(g)(2)(A).
202. See 120 CONG. REC. 15,741 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 5186-87 (statement of Sen. Williams); 88 Stat. 874-90; see also Jefferson,
supra note 16, at 620 (providing in-depth discussion of fiduciary standards
under the existing pension system).
203. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 646-47 (discussing the
foundation of ERISA's fiduciary law).
204. See Lurie, supra note 37, at 9.
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shall be impossible for any part of the pension trust to be
used for purposes other than the exclusive benefit of plan
participants and their beneficiaries. 205
This provision, referred to as "the exclusive benefit
rule," is one of the principle features of ERISA's fiduciary
law. ° The exclusive benefit rule reflects the duty of loyalty
found in the common law of trusts. The rule explicitly
requires that the employer, and other individuals who have
discretionary control over the management of the plan,
administer the trust solely in the interest of plan
participants and their beneficiaries.0 7
ERISA contains another provision closely related to the
exclusive benefit rule that also restricts the use of pension
assets. The "noninurement rule," found in § 403(c)(1),
provides that plan assets should neither "inure" to the
benefit of an employer nor be held for the purpose of anyone
except plan participants and their beneficiaries. Unlike
the exclusive benefit rule, which applies only while a plan is
ongoing, the noninurement rule applies at plan
termination.0 9 The noninurement rule states that on plan
termination "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the
benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive
[purpose] of providing benefits to participants in the plan
and their [beneficiaries] .210
The prohibited transaction rules are also an integral
part of ERISA's fiduciary law. These rules prevent any
"party in interest"21' from borrowing, transferring, or using
plan assets in any manner. The definition of "parties in
interest" includes employers and other plan fiduciaries.
Additionally, § 4975(c)(1)(D) and (e)(2)(C) of the Internal
Revenue Code specifically provides that it is unlawful for
the assets of a pension plan to be used for the benefit of "an
employer whose employees are covered by the plan."212 To
205. I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (1994).
206. See Medill, supra note 10, at 30-31.
207. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 678-79.
208. See ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999);
see also LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 679.
209. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 953.
210. ERISA, § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
211. See ERISA, § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1994) (defining term to
include fiduciaries, service providers, plan sponsors, and substantial owners of
sponsoring firms); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 701-13 (discussing the
prohibited transaction rules). See ERISA § 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (1994).
212. I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(D), (e)(2)(C) (1994).
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give force to the prohibited transaction rules, § 4975 of the
Internal Revenue Code initially imposes an excise tax of 5%
on all prohibited transactions. If, however, the prohibited
transaction is not corrected within a specified period of
time, § 4975 imposes a tax of 100%.213
The accounting rules under the Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB 87") create tension with both the
exclusive benefit rule and the prohibited transaction
rules.21 Although employers are not permitted to directly
use pension assets for the benefit of their companies, they
are required by FASB 87 to report the pension earnings on
their companies' financial statements."' Therefore, there is
an inherent conflict in the different roles of the employer.
On the one hand, as a fiduciary for the company, the
employer is obligated to act in the interests of the corporate
shareholders and produce pension surpluses to be reflected
in the financial statements.216 On the other hand, as an
ERISA fiduciary, the employer is obligated to operate
exclusively in the interests of plan participants and their
beneficiaries, using the pension surpluses to increase
benefits or secure the funding of the plan. 17
Thus, when traditional defined benefit plans are
converted to cash balance plans as a method of generating
profits for the benefit of the company and shareholders,
some would argue there is a breach of duty.218 However,
even if one does not believe that ERISA's fiduciary rules
prohibit employers from creating and using surplus plan
assets in this manner, at a minimum, the use of qualified
213. Id.
214. See FINANcIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, EMPLOYERS'
ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS (1985) (Statement No. 87, 1985).
215. Id.
216. In the June 15, 1999 Wall Street Journal, Ellen Schultz stated that
"Iswitching to Cash Balance Plans has fattened many pension plan surpluses.
Of the 12 pension plans with the largest surpluses, 10 are cash balance type
plans." Ellen Schultz, Accounts That Are in Surplus Because of Bull Market
Yield Credit for Employer, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1999, at Al. In the same issue,
US West's benefit director stated, "[flor years, people saw the pension as a
bucket of money you can't touch... [but now companies] are looking to not
leave the asset dormant, but use it to deliver better returns for the company."
Id. The senior vice president of Bank of America, Corp. stated "[t]o the extent
that we have pension income instead of pension costs, it improves our
earnings." Id.
217. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1) (1994).
218. See Statement of Karen W. Ferguson, supra note 36, at 108.
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plans to generate profits to enhance the financial position of
the company entirely at the expense of plan participants
who may have accepted lower wages in reliance on these
benefits, would seem to contravene the spirit of ERISA's
fiduciary law. 2
19
2. Overfunding in Traditional Defined Benefit Plans.
Although employers are permitted to recapture surplus
defined benefit plan assets on plan termination, the pension
law strongly discourages employers from doing so. There
are provisions designed to discourage both the creation of
funding excesses and the recapture of those assets from
traditional defined benefit plans. Some of these provisions
were a part of pension law well before the passage of
ERISA. These provisions raise questions about the extent to
which employers should be permitted to benefit from
funding surpluses that are created or increased after plan
conversions.
Section 404 of the Internal Revenue Code reflects the
pre-ERISA bias against overfunding. This section imposes a
ceiling on the deductibility of an employer's annual
contributions to a qualified plan."2 Employers are permitted
to deduct only amounts that fall within permissible limits.
An employer is never permitted to deduct amounts in
excess of the full funding limitation. A plan is considered
fully funded when the plan's assets equal the plan's accrued
liabilities.221 Thus, a plan can become fully funded if the
assets appreciate suddenly or if the experience of the plan
relative to the actuarial predictions is unexpectedly
favorable.
As a result of continued concern that the funding rules
permitted employers to build-up excess assets in their
pension plans, the Pension Protection Act of 1987 made
significant changes to the full funding limitation.222 This
219. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
220. This limitation existed prior to the passage of ERISA. Although the
primary focus of ERISA was to ensure that defined benefit plans were not
underfunded, ERISA also addressed overfunding.
221. The accrued liability is the difference between the present value of the
projected retirement benefits and the present value of the future normal cost of
the plan, where the normal cost is defined as the cost of maintaining the plan
for a given year. See I.R.C. § 412 (1994 & Supp. IH 1997).
222. See IRS Announcement 98-1 on Employee Plan Examination Guidelines
Related to IRC Sections 404 and 412 Dec. 22, 1997, 25 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA),
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legislation placed greater restrictions on funding strategies
by introducing the concept of "current liability."2" Under
the current liability approach, contribution levels are
limited by treating the plan as if it terminated. Accordingly,
the plan's obligations are determined without regard to
projections of future service and salary increases.2 4
One of the rationales for the deductibility limitation
was that contributions in excess of the deductible limits
were likely to create funding surpluses.22  Funding
surpluses are considered harmful primarily because they
are believed to create incentives for employers to terminate
their plans in order to recapture the excess plan assets.226
When recapture occurs, employees could be worse off than
they would had there been no plan at all, or if the plan had
been less generously funded. This is because they may have
accepted lower wages and saved less in reliance on their
expected retirement benefits.
There are numerous theories that explain how lowered
wages fund the cost of plan benefits. One view is that
participants give up wages in an amount that equals the
value of the benefits that accrue each year.227 Other theories
82, 82 (Jan. 5, 1998).
223. This was done because it was believed that employers were still taking
inappropriately large deductions for their annual contributions thereby creating
the potential for large fimding surpluses. But see Regina T. Jefferson, Defined
Benefit Plan Funding. How Much Is Too Much? 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 13
(1993) (suggesting that employers may be motivated by other reasons when
they aggressively fund their defined benefit plans).
224. See id. (providing an in depth discussion of the funding rules).
225. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b) (as amended in 1981) (outlining when
excess contributions may revert to the employer). Another rationale for the
limitation was that excess contributions do not constitute ordinary and
necessary expenses and were more likely prepayments for future years rather
than present accruals. See Rev. Rul. 64-159, 1964-1 C.B. 163 (ruling that excess
payments are not for services actually rendered and are therefore not
deductible). Also, another reason for the limitation on deductions is that
Congress is unwilling to subsidize the cost of inappropriately large benefits
through favorable tax treatment.
226. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b).
227. For example, assume that a plan provides a normal retirement benefit
of $10 per month per year of service payable at age sixty-five. At the end of one
year, an employee who is thirty years old would have earned a pension benefit
of $10 per month, payable at age sixty-five. Assume also that this benefit has a
present value of $80. Thus, under this theory the participant's current salary
would have been reduced by $80 in the first year for the first year's accruals.
This example is taken from EDWARD T. VEAL & EDWARD R. MACNIEWICZ,
PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS § 12.1.1, at 204-05 (1989).
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maintain that the reduction in a participant's wages equals
the level payments needed to fund the projected benefit.228
Under this theory, a participant's current wages would be
reduced by the level amounts necessary to fund the
amortized payments of the expected retirement benefit.229
While reduced wages and participant reliance are
problematic in any plan termination, including plans that
terminate with insufficient assets, they are particularly
troublesome in over-funded plans because the assets are
available but nevertheless not used for the benefit of plan
participants, or for their beneficiaries.
Another reason for the limitation on deductions in
pension plans is that Congress is unwilling to subsidize the
cost of inappropriately large benefits through the favorable
tax treatment of qualified pension plans.2 Thus, even in
the absence of concerns about the possibility of reversion,
policymakers do not believe that the public interest is best
served by extending tax benefits to unlimited contributions.
In tax qualified plans, annual contributions are not taxed
until the employee receives them, and the income on the
contributions is generated tax free.' The purpose of the
favorable tax treatment of qualified plans is to provide
incentives for employers to maintain plans that enable low
and moderate income employees to have adequate
retirement savings. However, without deductible
limitations, employers would be able to invest excessively
large amounts in their plans, essentially amounting to tax
free savings accounts.23 -To further discourage overfunding
in defined benefit plans, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 added
a 10% excise tax on nondeductible contribution to qualified
plans."3 The tax is cumulative and applies to both the
nondeductible contributions for the current year, as well as
to contributions made in prior years which have not yet
228. See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
229. For example, using the accrued benefit formula in the above example,
assume that the projected benefit based on thirty-five years of service is $350,
and the first year's amortization of this benefit is $315. As a result the
employee's wages would have been reduced $315 annually. Consequently, after
one year, if the plan terminates the employee theoretically would be entitled to
receive a benefit almost four times greater than the $10 accrued under the plan.
See id.
230. Jefferson, supra note 223, at 39.
231. I.R.C. §§ 72(t), 401(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
232. See LANGBEiN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 346.
233. I.R.C. § 4972(c)(1)(B) (1994).
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become deductible. 4 As a result, in some situations the
excise tax can apply to a single contribution for a period of
several years.
3. Reversions in Traditional Defined Benefit Plans. The
principal statutory limitation on asset reversion in
traditional defined benefit plans is found in § 4011(d)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code. This section provides that a
reversion of excess assets is prohibited until all liabilities to
participants and their beneficiaries are paid."' The
Treasury Regulations explain that employers are permitted
to recover on plan termination any balance that is due to
"erroneous actuarial computation.""3 The Internal Revenue
Service interprets "erroneous actuarial computation" very
broadly, so that effectively all assets in excess of plan
liabilities are attributed to actuarial error. Thus, when
overfunded defined benefit plans terminate, all of the
surplus assets can revert to the plan sponsors."'
Recaptured surplus assets are counted as income to the
corporation and are subject to the corporate income tax.238
In addition, an asset reversion excise tax of up to 50% is
levied on the same assets, if certain conditions are not
met.239
Although there have been proposals to allow
withdrawals of surplus assets from ongoing plans, under
existing law, plan termination is a prerequisite for the
recovery of surplus assets.24° This requirement makes it
possible for Congress to regulate the asset recovery and to
protect plan participants when assets are diverted away
from pension plans. Employers are permitted to recover
excess assets only when the plan documents explicitly
provide for reversions, and the reversions do not conflict
234. See id; see also LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 390.
235. I.R.C. § 411(d)(2) (1994).
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.4011-2(b) (as amended in 1981).
237. Plan surplus assets can revert only after the payment of all accrued
benefits.
238. See 48 C.F.R. § 9904.412-50 (1999).
239. GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 12 (discussing the requirements
related to the reductions in pension benefits).
240. See ERISA, § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
From an ongoing plan, amounts contributed by mistake can be recovered by an
employer within a specified period. Id. § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)




with any other provision of the law.24' Also, in the event of
plan termination, or partial termination, employers are
required to vest all affected participants in their accrued
benefits, to the extent that the benefits are funded. This
rule was designed to discourage employers from using plan
termination or mass lay-offs to prevent participants from
vesting in their pension rights in an effort to save plan
costs.' Thus, for example, a participant who is 25% vested
normally would receive only 25% of her accrued benefit if
she terminated employment with the employer. However, if
the plan terminated, the employee would be entitled to
receive 100% of her accrued benefit.
The asset reversion tax further discourages the
termination of overfunded defined benefit plans."' The
asset reversion tax was introduced in 1986 as a flat rate tax
of 10% on all excess amounts recovered by employers from
qualified plans.2' The reversion tax was later increased to
15% in 1988.245 Later, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1990 combined a flat rate excise tax with an optional
provision for using a portion of the surplus to increase the
accrued benefits of plan participants as a quid quo pro for
reduced rates.4 6 The Act amended the 15% rate to 20%,
conditioned upon the employer's transfer of 25% of the total
241. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 953.
242. Prior to 1990, the IRS used a bright line test to determine whether a
partial termination had occurred. If the percentage of participants excluded
from the plan equaled at least 50% for any reason, it was considered a
constructive partial termination. The Service abandoned the bright line test
and now looks to see if there is a substantial rate of turnover. See LANGBEIN &
WOLI, supra note 2, at 143. A partial termination occurs whenever a
substantial number of participants is excluded from a plan. See id. The
regulations prescribe a special rule that states "if a defined benefit plan
ceases ... future benefit accruals under the plan, a partial termination shall be
deemed to occur if, as a result of such cessation or decrease, a potential
reversion to the employer... maintaining the plan.., is created or increased."
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2(b)(2); I.R.C. § 411(d)(2)(b) (1994); see also LANGBEIN &
WOLK, supra note 2; Karen W. Ferguson & Karen D. Friedman, Center Clarifies
Comments on Cash Balance Plan Conversions, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 24, 2000,
at 2000 TNT 37-61 (arguing that cash balance plans amount to partial
terminations under the treasury regulations).
243. See I.R.C. § 4980 (1994).
244. See id.
245. See Pub. L. No. 100-647; I.R.C. § 6069(a) (1994).
246. The excise tax applies on plan termination as well as on partial plan
termination. See generally Norman P. Stein, Reversions from Pension Plans:
History, Policies and Prospects, 44 TAX. L. REV. 259 (1989) (evaluating pension
reversions in regards to tax policy issues).
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assets recaptured on plan termination to a qualified
replacement plan. 7 Alternatively, for the 20% rate, an
employer can provide a pro-rata benefit increase to the
accrued benefits of plan participants of at least 25% of the
recovered assets.248
Thus, the pension law has responded to concern about
funding surpluses by permitting them on the one hand, but
by denying current deductions for them and imposing an
excise tax on the other.2 49 The combination of the deduction
restrictions and the excise tax on nondeductible
contributions has made overfunding much less likely to
occur. Similarly, the law allows reversions, but the vesting
rules and the excise tax on reversions have made the
recovery of excess assets from qualified pension plans far
less appealing for plan sponsors.
4. Pension Surpluses in Cash Balance Plans. Although
limitations on deductibility and current liability restrictions
remain a part of current pension law, the motivations for an
employer to establish a retirement plan have changed.
Pension plans are no longer viewed by plan sponsors as
business expenses or as opportunities for large tax
deductions, but rather as sources of revenue for their
companies."5' Last year, the combined pension surplus,
which is the amount by which pension assets exceed
pension liabilities, reached more than $100 billion for the
Dow Jones Industrial Association companies ("DJIA"). 251 As
247. See Jefferson, supra note 223, at 74 n.195 and accompanying text.
248. See id.
249. Sections 404(a)(1) and (a)(3) disallow a deduction in the current year;
however, any excess may be carried forward and deducted in succeeding years
subject to the normal limitations on the maximum deductions. I.R.C. §§
404(a)(1), 404(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
250. See Vineeta Anand, Bottom Line: Pension Funds Become Profit Center,
20 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June 26, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Anand, Bottom
Line] (reporting findings from two studies conducted by the Federal Reserve
Board of S&P 500 firms).
251. The three main components of a company's pension cost are the service
cost, or the cost of benefits earned by workers during the current year, the
interest expense on the deferred benefits, and the return on pension fund
investments. At the DJIA companies, the expected return on pension fund
investments of $34 billion last year alone was more than enough to offset
interest costs of $23.7 billion and service costs of $8.3 billion. See Anand,
Bottom Line, supra note 250. Some of these companies reported having pension
income exceed total corporate income by as much as 10%. This figure was up
from $24 billion in prior years. See id.
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discussed above, when companies convert their traditional
defined benefit plans to cash balance plans, they frequently
increase pension income and create large pension
surpluses. 2  For example, when IBM converted its
traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan, it
increased its profits by $200 million dollars per year.25 A
study conducted by The Watson Wyatt Company showed
that as many as 40% of the companies that had converted
to cash balance plans had pension income.254 Of the twelve
pension plans in the private pension system that have the
largest surpluses, ten are cash balance plans.255
While the accounting rules permit companies to include
pension income as part of their overall profits, companies
are not permitted to siphon surplus pension assets to pay
for other business expenses.256 However, in some instances
employers have used excess pension assets for purposes
that advance their business objectives. For example, some
have used these funds to selectively enhance benefits in
connection with early retirement incentive programs as
part of their conversion program.257 Critics contend that
when employers use pension surpluses to pay for such
severance costs, they are in violation of ERISA's prohibited
transaction rules, as well as the Internal Revenue Code's
exclusive benefit rule.258 Also troubling is the fact that when
employers are permitted to use pension surpluses in this
manner without having tax consequences, there is
inconsistent treatment among employers who are similarly
situated. Employers who terminate overfunded defined
benefit plans and replace them with defined contribution
plans are required to pay income and excise taxes on the
recovered amounts. 59 However, employers who convert
their defined benefit plans and replace them with cash
balance plans are not. Although there are inherent
252. See supra Part II.C.
253. See Ferguson & Friedman, supra note 242.
254. William Pesek, Jr., Market Investment Produces More Income Than
Needed, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2000.
255. See Ferguson & Friedman, supra note 242.
256. Anand, Bottom Line, supra note 250, at 1.
257. See Vineeta Anand, Winners and Losers, supra note 163, at 20 (noting
that at the time of conversion many employers encourage employees to leave by
establishing early retirement incentive programs).
258. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(2), 4975(c)(1)(d), (e)(2)(c) (1994).
259. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
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differences between defined contribution plans and cash
balance plans, these differences would not appear to justify
such vastly different treatment.6 °
When company profits are primarily behind an
employer's decision to convert a well-funded traditional
defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan, it would seem
that concerns similar to those associated with funding
surpluses in ongoing defined benefit plans would register
with policymakers. Accordingly, there should be similar
limitations and disincentives for such practices. 261' Whether
funding surpluses are created through plan conversion or
aggressive funding strategies, there is the potential that the
funds will be used for the benefit of the employer and the
shareholders, rather than for the plan participants and
their beneficiaries. From the employees' perspective it is
irrelevant whether a shortfall in the expected retirement
benefits results from plan termination or from plan
conversion. In both situations, plan participants have
reasonably relied on the receipt of their expected retirement
benefits and the funds are available but are not being used
for their intended purpose.
Furthermore, cash balance plan conversions can be
viewed as the functional equivalent of plan terminations."'
From the perspective of the affected employees, there is
plan termination because no vestige of the pre-existing
defined benefit plan survives the cash balance plan
conversion. Also, a substantial number of participants have
been excluded from the plan. This position is supported
informally by descriptive literature written about cash
balance plan conversions in which employers refer to the
pre-existing defined benefit plan as the "old plan."63
Therefore, arguably, cash balance plan conversions
implicate application of the rules that were specifically
designed to prevent the employer and other plan fiduciaries
from using plan assets for their own benefit at the expense
of plan participants. They also implicate the application of
the rules that were designed to discourage employers from
freely using surplus plan assets for their own benefit. As a
260. See supra Part B of Introduction.
261. See infra Part V.
262. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-2 (1977).
263. See Saxinger, supra note 25, at 369; Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at
401; Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 702-03.
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result, some maintain that the conditions for imposing the
100% vesting rules, and the excise tax on asset reversions,
are satisfied on plan conversion.2
Even if the rules are not technically satisfied, however,
policymakers should have the same concern about
preventing employers from enjoying tax-free savings
accounts in conversion situations. Just as in the case of
asset reversion, the creation of plan surpluses to increase
company profits allows employers to use tax subsidized
funds for purposes inconsistent with the goal of the pension
program, and deprives employees portions of their
retirement benefits. Thus, the same bias against creating
and recapturing surpluses in traditional defined benefit
plans should exist against allowing employers to convert
their plans to cash balance plans solely for the benefit of the
company and the shareholders. Accordingly, employers
should be discouraged from converting their plans to cash
balance plans unless appropriate measures are taken to
protect affected plan participants.265  Without such
restrictions, the current treatment of cash balance plan
conversions appears to be unfair and inconsistent with
existing pension policy. 6
C. Employee Communication
In addition to the substantive issues raised by cash
balance plan conversions, the issue of employee
communication has also been a subject of much debate.267
One of the primary complaints made by employees affected
by cash balance plan conversions is that they were unable
to obtain adequate information regarding the changes to
their existing plan and the impact of those changes on their
expected retirement benefits." A survey of employers who
264. See Ferguson & Friedman, supra note 242.
265. See infra Part V.
266. See Jefferson, supra note 223, at 18-19 (discussing the controversial
implications of asset reversion in defined benefit plans).
267. See Drigotas, supra note 30, at 39 (discussing the IBM cash balance
plan conversion and many employees' belief that the plan changes were
inadequately explained).
268. Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 27-35 (1999) (statement of Janet
Krueger) (describing complaints held by many of the effected IBM employees
due to the cash balance conversion).
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had converted their traditional defined benefit plans to cash
balance plans revealed that in most cases, participants
were provided only general information about the changes
to their expected retirement benefits, although in some
instances the changes resulted in as much as a 20%
reduction.269 Furthermore, only 25% of employers provided
sufficient information to enable plan participants to
compare the benefits that they had already accrued under
the existing accrual formula to those they could expect to
accrue under the new formula.27° As a result of these
practices, many of the cases highlighted in the media have
dealt with employees who were as unhappy about the way
their employer communicated the changes as they were
about the changes themselves.2
The Senate Finance Committee's version of the
Retirement Security and Savings Act of 2000 addressed the
problem of insufficient information regarding plan
amendments. It included a provision which mandated more
disclosure with respect to plan amendments that result in
significant reductions in participants' projected retirement
benefits.272  The bill required that employers give
participants written notice regarding plan amendments
that would decrease the rate at which future plan benefits
accrue, including the reduction of plan enhancements such
as subsidized early retirement benefits.27  The bill
specifically required that, in the event of conversion from a
traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan,
employees receive information that allows them to
determine the impact of the change on their future benefit
269. Vineeta Anand, Potential Reductions Weren't Disclosed, 20 PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, June 26, 2000, at 20 (reporting on a survey conducted by the
UNIFI Network of 100 employers). The survey revealed that less than 33% of
the employers modifying their traditional defined benefit pension plans gave
employees detailed information about the changes. See id.
270. See id. at 20.
271. Statement of Sen. Leahy, supra note 36, at 5 (using IBM as an example
of the controversy sparked by the conversion to cash balance plans). See Colleen
T. Congel & Elizabeth A. White, Cash Balance Plans: Consensus on CB
Conversions Unlikely; IBM Official Defends Company's Actions, Pens. & Ben.
Rep. (BNA), Sept. 13, 1999, at 2211.
272. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Senate Finance Committee Gives Green
Light to Cash Balance Conversions, 89 TAX NOTES 141, 142 (2000) (noting the




accruals."4 However, to date, legislation that requires
employers to provide complete and accurate information
specific to each participant after conversions occur has not
been passed."5
V. PROPOSAL
The cash balance plan concept itself is not problematic.
However, conversions of well-funded traditional defined
benefit plans to cash balance plans can be problematic for
the reasons discussed above."' However, this result is not
inevitable. The pension law could be changed to correct
these deficiencies without discouraging the use of cash
balance plans as alternative retirement savings
instruments. The adoption of more stringent disclosure
requirements and a floor on the reduction of participants'
expected retirement benefits would eliminate some of the
concerns surrounding cash balance plan conversions. This
approach would ensure that plan participants receive
retirement benefits that better approximate their expected
benefits. Additionally, this approach would bring the
treatment of cash balance plan conversions in line with
other pension laws and policies.
A. Notification and Disclosure Requirement
Although several cash balance plan conversions have
received a great deal of attention as a result of well
informed and technologically sophisticated employees who
voiced concern about reductions in their accrued benefits
publicly, these cases represent the exception rather than
the rule.' Generally, employees do not fully understand or
appreciate the impact of cash balance plan conversions on
their expected retirement benefits until they are ready to
retire. Better employer communication could easily rectify
274. See id.
275. See infra Part V.A.
276. See supra Part IV.
277. Recognizing that the IBM employees were exceptional, an online
magazine awarded the IBM employees with the "Disgruntled Employees of the
Year" award. The IBM employees were recognized for their successful fight
against a new cash balance pension plan. See Daniella Sessa, IBM Employees
Honored for Protest Against Cash Balance Pension Plans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31,
1999, at B2.
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this situation. Unfortunately, however, many employers
and consultants view the employees' failure to understand
fully the effect of plan conversion on their projected
retirement benefits as a distinct advantage.278
For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that an
actuary from a leading consulting firm stated at a
professional meeting that cash balance plan conversions
were particularly desirable because they "mask a lot of
changes." '79 On another occasion, the Wall Street Journal
reported actuaries from another firm explained: "It is not
until they are ready to retire that [the employees]
understand how little they are actually getting." " These
remarks undoubtedly capture the sentiment of some
employers who desire to mislead their employees when they
convert their traditional defined benefit plans to cash
balance plans.281
One of the effects of the sudden popularity of cash
balance plans is that the regulations regarding cash
balance plan conversions have not kept pace.8 2 There is
little regulatory guidance and only limited notice given to
employees in connection with cash balance plan
conversions.' Neither the Internal Revenue Service nor the
Labor Department has issued official guidance on cash
balance plan conversions, and consumer groups have just
begun to understand the impact of these plans on employee
278. See Stein, supra note 139, at 30.
279. See id. In contrast, when employers terminate overfunded traditional
defined benefit plans and replace them with defined contribution plans,
employees can readily compare their projected benefits under the two plans.
280. Ellen E. Schultz, Actuaries Become Red-Faced over Recorded Pension
Talk, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1999, at Cl; see Stein, supra note 139, at 30.
281. See Ellen E. Schultz et al., Cash Balance System's Effect on Older
Workers Stirs IRS, Congress, EEOC, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1999, at Al
(reporting that, after news leaked that IBM was considering a cash balance
plan conversion, employees discovered that a "pension calculator" had been
removed from the company's internal computer system, presumably, to make it
more difficult for employees to compute the value of their pensions).
282. See supra Part II.B.
283. Ellen E. Schultz & Glenn Burkins, Critics of Cash-Balance Pension
Plans Will Testify Before Senate Panel Today, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1999, at
A3; see also Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 148 (1999) (discussing the lack of
notice given to employees regarding plan amendments).
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benefits.2" As a consequence, affected plan participants
currently have no source for unbiased information to help
them determine if they are better or worse off as a result of
a plan conversion.
The need for accurate and complete information about
the impact of the changes is particularly acute since
individual participants sometimes have a role in the
selection of their retirement benefits under cash balance
plan conversion schemes."8 5 For example, some employers
allow participants to choose to remain in the existing plan
until they retire, or for a specified period of years. Thus, the
participant would need to have more than a general
description of her benefits under each accrual formula to
make an informed decision.286 This information is also
essential for plan participants to calculate the amount of
additional personal savings they may need to supplement
their retirement incomes, as a result of the conversion.8 7
The disclosure requirements under present law do not
speak directly to cash balance plans or to cash balance plan
conversions. 28 However, they do set minimum guidelines
that employers must follow concerning the type of
information they must provide participants about their
plans.289 ERISA explicitly requires that participants be
given written summaries of their plans, referred to as
summary plan descriptions. The Department of Labor
regulations further require that the summary plan
descriptions be "sufficiently comprehensive to apprise the
plan participants of their rights and obligations under the
plan." 90
284. The IRS has indicated that it is waiting for Congress to enact
legislation before it makes any rulings on cash balance plan conversions. See
Arcady & Mellors, supra note 46, at 28.
285. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 26 (finding that many plan
participants are given a significant role in choosing plan benefits, but that little
if any information is provided in order to aid the employees in making an
informed decision).
286. See Ellen E. Schultz, Ins and Outs of 'Cash Balance' Plan: Employees
Will Need to Know What Effects the New Setup Could Have on Their Pensions,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1998, at C1.
287. See supra Part V.C.
288. See supra note 284.
289. GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 37.
290. See id. There is significant variation in the quality of information
explaining the cash balance plan formula to plan participants. See id.
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Interestingly, one of the developments of the conversion
controversy has been the proliferation of websites that
provide such information. Some of the websites have been
dedicated to communication with employees regarding a
specific employer; others have been established to give more
general information on cash balance plan conversions.
Some of the websites provide an explanation of the
calculation of projected benefits, and include the actuarial
tables used in these calculations.29'
As discussed earlier, the Senate version of the
Retirement Security Act of 2000 included several provisions
that impact cash balance plans, including a requirement
that employers give written notice when there is a
significant reduction in their projected retirement benefit.292
The bill also required that employers give affected
participants "benefit estimation tool kits" that would enable
them to determine the impact of the conversion on their
projected retirement benefits.293 Although this information
is helpful to affected plan participants, this disclosure
requirement is insufficient because it relies on a self-help
approach.29 If employees are unable or unwilling to use the
"kit", they will not have accurate and complete information
about their expected retirement benefits. This situation
could adversely impact their retirement security.
When employers convert traditional defined benefit
plans to cash balance plans, the company is required to
disclose the financial impact of the conversion in its
financial statements.295 Thus, actuaries must quantify the
financial effects of the conversion, including any transition
benefits or changes in eligibility requirements adopted to
291. In many cases these websites have been designed by the affected
employees, themselves. See Drigotas, supra note 30, at 39.
292. See Forman, supra note 272.
293. See id. at 141.
294. See id.
295. A company's conversion from a traditional defined benefit pension plan
accrual formula to a cash balance plan accrual formula generally constitutes a
negative plan amendment, for which the company would recognize on its
financial statements a prospective reduction in service costs. For such a
conversion, a company must amend the existing plan to provide for the new
benefit structure. See Arcady & Mellors, supra note 46, at 25. In accordance
with Statement No. 132 of the FASB, a company must make necessary
disclosures in the notes of the financial statements. See id. at 27.
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protect older employees. 9 ' However, there are no
comparable requirements for disclosure to affected plan
participants.
Employers should be required to provide meaningful
disclosure about how a conversion will affect plan
participants and their retirement expectations"9 A properly
designed disclosure requirement should hold employers
responsible for the dissemination of information that
compares the benefits that participants accrued under the
existing accrual formula to those that they will accrue
under the new cash balance plan formula."' This
information should be individualized and not general.
Furthermore, all information regarding any potential
reductions in the expected retirement benefits of affected
plan participants should be definite and quantifiable,
regardless of how small. If, as a result of different interest
rate assumptions or other adjustments, the opening account
balance in the cash balance plan is less than the lump sum
present value of the accrued benefit, participants should be
notified and the difference should be explained. Also,
employers should be required to notify participants if they
qualify for transitional benefits for older workers.
Employers are likely to resist a disclosure requirement
such as this one on the basis that this level of notification is
too burdensome and expensive. However, employees are
currently unable to make informed decisions regarding
their retirements without specific information about their
own circumstances. Thus, the importance of the need
justifies the additional costs and administrative burden.
Furthermore, it is likely that the information contained in
the actuarial evaluations of cash balance plans could easily
be adapted for this purpose.299
296. The company generally discloses the financial effects in the pension
footnote as a single line item in the reconciliation of the beginning and ending
balances of the pension benefits obligation. If the amendment has a material
effect on the financial statements, the company discloses the nature of the
amendment and its effects on the projected benefits obligation and pension cost
in the notes to the financial statements. See id. at 27-28.
297. See Stein, supra note 139, at 31 (stating that employees often do not
understand the proposed plan amendments and likewise are not provided with
sufficient explanation in order to understand proposed changes in pension
coverage).
298. See supra Part N.C.
299. Actuarial evaluations are extensive reports of defined benefit plans.
There is a requirement that these reports be made periodically.
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B. Reduction of Retirement Benefits
1. Current Trends. As explained above, when employers
convert traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance
plans, mid-career employees may experience the worst of
both plans."' They may be unable to benefit from the effects
of higher earnings under the defined benefit plan formula,
and they may have insufficient time to accrue adequate
benefits under the cash balance plan formula."0 ' Thus, their
benefits would be earned under each plan at periods when
their accrual rates are lowest. Because future accruals are
not protected under current law by the anti-cutback rules,
employers who convert their plans are not required to
provide relief to participants placed in this situation."'
Although not required, some employers voluntarily
design their cash balance plans to mitigate the effects of
changing plan types on mid-career employees.
Approximately two-thirds of the companies that convert
their traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans
offer transitional benefits to offset some portion of the
effects of plan conversion on older employees.0 3 For
example, some companies may permit older workers to
remain in the existing plan for five to ten years.3 4 This
solution provides full relief to some, but only partial relief
to those who retire after the period expires. Participants
who retire after the transition period still may experience a
significant reduction in their expected retirement benefits
because the switch for them would occur later in their
careers, at a point when presumably their salaries would be
higher. s
Another method used by employers to address the
effects of mid-career changes in pension coverage is to
provide certain employees extra pay credits adjusted for age
and service. Usually, these benefits are provided for a
300. See supra Part IV.A.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See Ellen E. Schultz, Problems with Pensions: What You Don't Know
About the Cash-Balance Retirement Plans Can Hurt You, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8,
1999, at 8 (noting methods of providing relief to participants after conversion).
304. Id.
305. See id. (noting that to address this problem some companies offer to
allow older employees to remain in the old pension plan for ten years, before
switching them to the cash balance plan).
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specified period of time. For example, one company
provided additional pay credits for individuals age forty-five
and older with at least ten years of service."0 6 This approach
requires an actuary to determine the amount of transition
benefit necessary to replace reductions in the expected
future accruals of the affected plan participants."7 Under
this type of scheme, however, there is no relief for
employees who miss the cut-off period.
Relatively few companies have taken the more
aggressive approach of guaranteeing no reduction in the
expected retirement benefit for all affected plan
participants."8 This can be accomplished by either keeping
participants under the prior plan, or by offering the
participant the greater of the benefits earned under both
plans until they retire or terminate employment. This type
of guarantee can also be accomplished by giving plan
participants a choice of having their benefits accrue under
the existing formula, or under the new cash balance plan
formula.
2. A New Minimum Standard. As discussed above,
unless some type of remedial measure is used to mitigate
the adverse effects of plan conversion on older employees,
they generally experience significant shortfalls in their
projected retirement benefits as a result of plan
conversion.0 9 Projected retirement benefits in traditional
defined benefit plans are determined by multiplying the
projected years of service by the projected final pay. The
projected benefit, not the accrued benefit, is the amount
that plan participants bargain for, and rely upon for
retirement planning purposes.10 Employees accept lower
wages and reduce their personal savings in exchange for
their projected retirement benefits. As a result, their
personal savings are likely to be less than they would be if
306. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 36.
307. See supra Part IV.A (explaining upon cash balance plan conversion
that an opening account balance must be established for each individual plan
participant).
308. See GAO REPORT 2000, supra note 32, at 35 (noting 9% of the cash
balance plans surveyed by the GAO provided this guarantee).
309. See supra Part V.B.1.
310. See Jefferson, supra note 223, at 24.
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they had not expected the benefits promised by the plan. " '
Thus, when employers convert well-funded traditional
defined benefit plans to cash balance plans there should be
a minimum standard that establishes a floor on the
reduction of projected retirement benefits in the plan. This
would ensure that all plan participants receive amounts
more representative of the benefits on which they have
reasonably relied. Additionally, in situations where the
conversions of traditional defined benefit plans to cash
balance plans create or increase plan surpluses, there
should be a requirement that some portion of the surplus be
used to increase the projected benefits of plan participants.
A minimum standard for the protection of plan
participants in cash balance plan conversions should also
eliminate the use of wear-away periods. 312 It is difficult to
defend a practice that results in certain participants being
excluded from current accruals indefinitely, while other
participants accrue benefits under the same plan formula
during the same period. Wear-away periods create a
perception of unfairness that potentially threatens the
integrity of the private pension system. 13
The ban on wear-aways should also include early
retirement benefits accrued before plan conversion. It has
been argued by some that the elimination or reduction of
subsidized early retirement benefits significantly
contributes to the wear-away problem."4 This is because
after conversion, the initial account balance of a
311. See supra Part IV.B.3; see also Jefferson, supra note 223, at 24 (citing
RIcHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 10-11 (1986), for
the proposition that employees reduce personal savings in reliance on future
pension benefits).
312. See Ellen E. Schultz & Glen Burkins, Critics of Cash-Balance Pension
Plans Will Testify Before Senate Panel Today, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1999, at A3
(noting that both IBM and Athena, Inc. converted to cash balance plans and
offered employees the choice to remain in the old plan or convert immediately to
the cash balance plan).
313. See supra note 175. For purposes of age discrimination, the protected
age is forty. Thus, employers are not permitted to disproportionately reduce the
accrued benefits of plan participants age forty and above when they amend
their plans. However, individuals age forty and above comprise the group most
likely to be adversely affected by changes in the accrual formula when
traditional defined benefit plans are converted to cash balance plans. For this
reason, many believe that cash balance plan conversions are per se
discriminatory.
314. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 404 (providing detailed analysis
of wear-away as they apply to cash balance conversions).
2001] 569
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
participant's cash balance plan account is based upon the
benefit payable at normal retirement age.115 Thus, the
initial account balance does not reflect the value of
subsidized early retirement benefit accrued before
conversion. 16 As a result, a wear-away period will occur for
some employees because their opening account balances in
the cash balance plan are less than the values of their
accrued benefits including the early retirement benefits
under the traditional defined benefit formula.
Consequently, in some instances it could take several years
before the balance of the cash balance plan equals the value
of the accrued benefit under the traditional plan at the time
of conversion.31 '
Assuming the elimination of all wear-away periods, a
minimum reduction standard should be established to
prevent older employees from experiencing the worst of
both plans, due to plan conversion. The minimum standard
would apply whenever a participant's accrued benefit under
the traditional defined benefit plan formula was less than
the accrued benefit under the cash balance plan. The
minimum standard would require that employers
guarantee all plan participants affected by the plan
conversion a benefit at least as large as the average of the
accrued benefit under the old accrual formula and the
accrued benefit under the cash balance plan. This
requirement partially corrects the effect of mid-career
conversions that skew more valuable benefits to younger
plan participants. This requirement also places a floor on
the reduction of older participants' expected retirement
benefits after plan conversion.
Additionally, to the extent that plan conversion creates
or increases a plan surplus, an employer should be required
to use a portion of that surplus to increase on a pro rata
basis the projected retirement benefits of all affected
participants. For example a flat rate of 10% could be used
for this purpose. The requirement that a portion of the
surplus be used to increase benefits could be structured
similar to the tax on reversions under § 4980, in which the
employer is given the option of using 20% of the surplus to
increase benefits under the terminated plan in exchange for
315. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
316. See supra Part IV.A.
317. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 25, at 404-05.
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a lower reversion tax rate.318 The increase in benefits
assures plan participants of receiving some portion of plan
surpluses generated by the conversion. This result is
appropriate because the surpluses arguably were paid for,
at least in part, by the plan participants who accepted lower
wages on the belief that they would receive their projected
benefits when they retired.319 Furthermore, having a
requirement that employers use a portion of the surplus
that was created or increased as a result of plan conversion
is also more consistent with the treatment of overfunded
pension plans and reversions of excess assets on plan
terminations.3"0
To illustrate the proposed minimum benefit on plan
conversion, assume an individual age sixty has thirty years
of service when her traditional defined benefit plan is
converted to a cash balance plan on January 1, 2001.
Further, assume at the time of conversion this individual's
annual accrued benefit under the traditional defined benefit
plan formula was $11,600, payable at age sixty-five. Using
a salary scale projection of 4%, further assume that her
projected retirement benefit was $15,700 per year, under
this formula. Also assume that a 6% discount rate was used
to determine her opening account balance under the cash
balance plan formula of $9000. Accordingly, her projected
benefit under the proposed minimum standard is at least
$10,400 per year. The following chart summarizes this
example:
Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Jan. 1
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Defined Benefit Plan $11,600 $12,500 $13,050 $14,600 $15,700
Accrued Benefit at
Age 65
Cash Balance Plan $9000 $9400 $9700 $10,100 $10,400
Accrued Benefit at
Age 65
Under current law, if the employer instates a wear-
away period, this participant would accrue no new pension
318. I.R.C. § 4980(d) (1994); see supra Part IV.B.3.
319. See supra Part IV.B.3.
320. The 10% rate is consistent with the excise tax on nondeductible
contributions under I.R.C. § 4972(a) (1994).
321. See Arcady & Mellors, supra note 46, at 26.
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benefits during the five years subsequent to the plan
conversion from November 1, 1999 to January 1, 2003.
Thus, when she retires in 2003 she would receive a benefit
of $11,600 per year, rather than her projected benefit of
$15,700.
Under the proposal described above there would be no
wear-away period. The participant would continue to accrue
benefits after the date of conversion. Assuming the
participant works until she reaches age sixty-five, her
retirement benefit would be determined by averaging the
two accrued benefits under both plans as of January 1,
2003.2' Therefore, her minimum retirement benefit would
equal at least $13,050 per year.3  This represents a benefit
amount that is less than it would have been under the
traditional defined benefit plan accrual formula, but more
than the accrued benefit under the cash balance plan
accrual formula. Additionally, if the conversion of the
traditional defined benefit plan to the cash balance plan
created or increased a surplus, the participant's retirement
benefit of $13,050 would be increased by her pro rata share
of 10% of the surplus.
This result strikes a balance between what is optimal
for the employer and what is optimal for the employee. This
result would not appear to burden employers so severely
that they would be discouraged from establishing cash
balance plans. At the same time, this result provides
significantly greater protection to the plan participants who
are most vulnerable when their traditional defined benefit
accrual formulas are converted to cash balance plan
formulas. Also, the requirement that some portion of the
surplus be used by the employer to increase the benefits of
plan participants is responsive to concerns that reduced
wages have funded the surplus. Finally, this result is more
consistent with the treatment of overfunded plans and
assets reversions because it prevents employers from
creating and using funding surpluses without restriction.
322. ($15,700 + $10,400)/2 = $13,050
323. That is, she would have a minimum benefit of $13,050, which would
actually be increased by her pro rata share of 10% from surplus.
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CONCLUSION
Cash balance plans are hybrid plans designed to offer
the best characteristics of both the traditional defined
benefit plan and the defined contribution plan, while at the
same time minimizing the less desirable features of each
type of plan. Specifically, cash balance plans combine the
portability and simplicity of defined contribution plans with
the predictability and security of traditional defined benefit
plans. Cash balance plans also eliminate the regulatory and
administrative burdens of traditional defined benefit plans
and the risk exposure of plan participants in defined
contribution plans. As a result, cash balance plans are
viable alternatives to traditional retirement savings
arrangements.
However, the conversions of traditional defined benefit
plans to cash balance plans are highly controversial. This is
so not because of the inherent characteristics of cash
balance plans but because of the disparate impact of plan
conversion on older plan workers. Conversions of
traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans can
significantly reduce the expected retirement benefits of
older plan participants. These employees often experience
the worst of both plans when traditional defined benefit
plans are converted to cash balance plans. This is because
they are more likely to accrue their retirement benefits in
each plan during periods when accrual rates are lowest.
Another issue presented by cash balance plan conversions
concerns the use of plan assets by the employer. When
traditional defined benefit plans are converted to cash
balance plans, plan surpluses frequently are created or
increased as a result of the reduction of future plan cost.
Because participants arguably have accepted lower wages
in reliance on the receipt of their expected retirement
benefits, and because the plan assets have received
favorable tax treatment, the appropriate use of surplus plan
assets created or increased in this manner raises many
serious concerns.
Both proponents and opponents will acknowledge that
employers have the legal right at any time to amend their
retirement plans to use different accrual formulas, or even
to completely terminate their plans without ever replacing
them. Thus, the controversy over cash balance plans is not
about whether employers can convert their traditional
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defined benefit plans to cash balance plans, but rather
about that extent to which the rights and expectations of
plan participant are protected when they do. Until this
question is resolved, many employers who considered
establishing cash balance plans as their primary retirement
savings vehicles will be reluctant to do so because they fear
negative publicity and the uncertainty of future regulation.
Notwithstanding the intensity of the debate
surrounding cash balance plan conversions, it is possible to
strike a balance between the interests of employers and
those of employees when traditional defined benefit plans
are replaced with cash balance plans. This can be
accomplished by: (1) requiring that employers who convert
their traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans
provide sufficient notice to affected plan participants
regarding the impact of the change on their projected
retirement benefits; and (2) limiting the amounts by which
the retirement benefit of affected plan participants can be
reduced as a result of plan conversions. This proposed
solution represents a compromise. It mitigates the effects of
conversion on plan participants previously covered by
traditional defined benefit plans but does not burden
employers so severely that they would be discouraged from
establishing or maintaining cash balance plans in the
future.
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